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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Affordable housing is a major challenge for the low-income households 
living in the city of Johannesburg. Many jobs are in the city while most of 
decent and affordable housing is at the city periphery. This creates a 
disadvantage as low income housing is located far from the area of 
concentrated commercial and employment opportunities. This group of 
citizens incur high transport costs to access these opportunities despite 
being in lower income bracket. Housing for households earning R3 500 
per month and below in the inner city of Johannesburg is very limited yet 
the demand is very high. This forces these households to live in bad 
buildings as there is limited alternative to formal and decent 
accommodation available for them.  
 
The Bad Buildings Programme (BBP) was one of the interventions that 
City of Johannesburg (COJ) developed to address bad buildings in the 
inner city (1999-2007). BBP aimed to address housing needs for the 
households earning R3 500 per month and below. The intention was to 
ensure that bad buildings become viable and productive economic assets. 
The research aims to determine whether the BBP has met its strategic 
requirement of providing decent and affordable housing to low-income 
households living in the inner city. The data was collected from group of 
policy makers and officials1 who participated in the BBP who worked in 
BBP through face to face interviews. The findings show that BBP did not 
alleviate low income housing in the inner city of Johannesburg. This 
research concludes that BBP did not fulfil its objective of improving the 
quality of life of low income inner city residents.  
                                            
1 Officials from the City of Johannesburg and Inner City Property Scheme officials, Former 
Executive Director of the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) and also independent 
researchers 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The Government of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, hereinafter SA) 
provides housing in order to address housing backlog for low income 
households2 in the country. Most housing assistance in SA is targeted at 
people earning less than R3 500 per month (SERI, 2013). There are 
various affordable housing programmes and opportunities that respond to 
the low income housing needs. Besides all the government housing 
initiatives, there is still large unmet demand of adequate housing for low 
income people in the country (Department of Human Settlements, 2015).  
 
Affordable housing is a major challenge for low-income households and 
the situation is no different for people living in the inner city of 
Johannesburg (COHRE, 2005). There is large unmet demand of 
affordable housing for the low income households (ibid.). Due to limited 
housing alternatives for low-income citizens and poor migrants living in the 
inner city of Johannesburg, these city dwellers tend to find shelter in 
overcrowded flats and in deteriorated buildings or what we will call in these 
research, bad buildings (Tissington, 2014). 
 
The bad buildings were once good buildings and had a good occupancy 
and management. Figure 1-1 shows the location of bad buildings in the 
inner city. Some of the owners have passed on, left the buildings in the 
family trust, disappeared or lost the ability to manage and collect rent from 
the buildings and decided to abandon the buildings (Steyn, 2015). 
                                            
2In this research report, low income households refers to households earning R0-R3500 per 
month  
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Figure 1-1: Map of Inner City showing Bad Buildings 
 
Source: City of Johannesburg 
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As a result, once good buildings have become neglected, dysfunctional, 
owe the city property rates and failed to meet the legislation and by-laws 
(Zack et al., 2009). There are different categories of bad buildings. Zack et 
al. (2009:54/55) categorise bad buildings as:  
• “Slum-lorded buildings  
• Buildings with absentee landlords  
• Buildings with small-scale Landlords  
• Speculated and vacant buildings  
• Hijacked buildings and buildings hosting fraudulent practices  
• Public sector owned buildings  
• Sectional title buildings  
• Buildings that are vulnerable to degeneration” 
 
There is no credible data of the number of bad buildings in the city. The 
number of bad buildings ranges from 122 (ICPS) to 235 (COHRE, 2005). 
Additionally, according 2011 report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
the city identified 1 305 slum buildings (SERI 2013). The MSF report 
states that these slum buildings house more than 250 000 people, and 82 
of the buildings house 50 000 to 60 000 people with overcrowded and 
appalling living conditions. As a result, the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality (hereinafter referred to as COJ) developed a Bad 
Building Programme (BBP) with the aim to refurbish the abandoned, 
dilapidated and illegally occupied buildings.  
 
The study, evaluates the BBP. The aim is to assess whether BBP has 
responded to the housing needs of low-income households living in the 
inner city of Johannesburg. The chapter provides the background of BBP, 
problem statement, main research question and sub-questions. Lastly the 
chapter provides outline of the structure of this research. 
4 
 
1.2 Bad Building Programme 
In 1999, the council of COJ approved Bad Building Programme (BBP) as 
part of Inner City Regeneration Scheme which specifically aimed to 
address the issue of bad buildings in the inner city and low income 
housing (COJ 2010). Several organisations (table 1-1) engaged together 
to come up with the policy on how to revive the inner city (Rubin, 2015). 
The main aim was to create Johannesburg as a “World Class African City” 
by addressing urban decay thus creating neat and order in the inner city. 
BBP initially started as Bad Building Programme in 1999 and was later 
changed to Better Buildings Programme in 2001 and then transferred to 
Inner City Property Scheme (ICPS) in 2007 (Figure 1-2). This study looks 
at the BBP from 1999 to 2007 with an aim to find out how many buildings 
were successfully refurbished thus provide affordable housing for low 
income households living in the inner city of Johannesburg. 
 
Table 1-1: Organisations involved in BBP 
Government      
City of Johannesburg  
Gauteng Provincial Government  
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 
Inner City Housing Upgrade Trust 
Johannesburg Development Agency 
Johannesburg Property Company 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
Joint Project: Private and Public Sector 
Central Johannesburg Partnership 
Inner City Office 
Housing Finance Resource Programme  
Private Sector 
Affordable Housing Company 
Johannesburg Afrikaanse Sakekamer 
Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
South African Property Owners’ Association 
Civil Society/NGO 
Centre for applied Legal Studies 
Johannesburg Inner City Community Forum 
 
Source: Rubin (2015: 214) 
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Figure 1-2: Timeline of development and demise of Bad/Better Building Programme 
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The objectives of the BBP were to facilitate urban regeneration, recover 
the debt from rates, taxes and services, improve the quality of low income 
city residents who live in bad buildings and provide adequate, decent and 
affordable housing to low income households in the inner city (COJ, 2010). 
SERI (2013) views BBP as a strategy for COJ to address low income 
housing needs. However, Rubin (2015) stipulates that the main driving 
forces of BBP were to create the functional property market and to remove 
poor bad building residents from unsafe and unhygienic living 
environment.  
 
Figure 1-3 summarises different models that were used in BBP. COJ 
(2010) explains that their plan was to identify dilapidated buildings which 
their rates and services owed to the city exceed the value of the building 
(figure 1-3, model 1). The City thought it would own the buildings but this 
was against the legislation such as Municipal Finance Management Act 
(Rubin, 2015). The City sold the buildings to private developers aiming to 
recoup some of the debts. 
 
The city acquired (expropriated) bad buildings and either gave them away 
or sold them at discounted prices  to not-for-profit companies with an aim 
to recover debts while also turning bad buildings into viable business 
entities (figure 1-3, model 2). The programme focused on identifying non-
profit organisations to upgrade and refurbish bad buildings. The idea of the 
BBP was to sell these buildings to housing developers, who will then 
renovate and refurbish them and rent them out possibly for low cost 
housing. The aim was to manage and maintain the residential buildings 
occupied by the poor households into more secure and well managed 
residential units (COHRE, 2005).  
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Figure 1-3: Systematic diagram of different models of BBP 
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In 2001, the City committed R50 million into the BBP targeting to 
expropriate bad buildings and then carry out the refurbishment of the 
buildings (Rubin, 2015). Then the City would sell the renovated buildings 
at the market value price (figure 1-3, model 3). In 2001, BBP was moved 
to Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) and then renamed Better 
Building Programme (figure 1-3, model 4) (ibid.). According to Rubin 
(2015) 150 bad buildings were identified and included in the BBP and it is 
estimated that 12 buildings were successfully refurbished and renovated. 
BBP moved from one department3 from another because it was in conflict 
with various departmental objectives and was finally transferred to Inner 
City Property Scheme (ICPS) in 2007 (COJ, 2010). 
 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
The City of Johannesburg is the largest city in SA and a major economic 
hub of Africa (COJ, 2007). As a result, the city attracts migrants from other 
provinces, Africa as well as the rest of the world (ibid.). According to 
Planact/CUBES (2007) Johannesburg has many poor migrants who come 
to the city for better living and economic opportunities than their respective 
places of origin. This population increase in the city increases the demand 
for jobs and services such as housing among others.  
 
Due to scarce job opportunities and limited affordable and decent housing 
for low income inner city residents, some of these migrants find it difficult 
to access formal employment and housing and as a result seek their 
livelihoods in the informal economy. As a result they enter into informal 
economy and live in bad buildings which are overcrowded and dilapidated 
(Planact/CUBES, 2007).This is because income in the informal economy 
is not sufficient hence they seek shelter in the cheap accommodation 
close to where they work, hence they live in the inner city buildings which 
                                            
3In early 2000s, BBP was in the City’s housing department and was stagnant. In mid-2000 it 
transferred to JPC (Rubin, 2015).  
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in most cases are bad buildings. Bad buildings offer affordable 
accommodation ranging from R100 to R1400 per month (Tissington, 
2014). 
 
Reviewing the location of Income Groups on a map of Johannesburg 
reveals that low income groups are mostly located at the city periphery, far 
from the major economic activities (figure 4-1). First National Bank 
property barometer reports that about 47 per cent of the affordable 
housing is located in black townships which are at the city periphery 
(Department of Human Settlements, 2015) while many jobs are in the city. 
This creates a disadvantage as low income housing is located far from the 
area of concentrated commercial activities and also employment 
opportunities. In order to access these opportunities, low income group 
incur high transport costs despite being in lower income bracket. Social 
costs abound as they often lose touch with their personal, family and 
social connections from the city. They must endure traffic menace and 
spend long hours in commuting between their locations and the city. 
 
Granted the challenges above, some of low income group find it 
necessary to stay close to or in the city near the opportunities. According 
to 2011 population census, approximately 122 000 people (almost half of 
the people living in the inner city) are earning less than R3 200per month. 
This income group can only manage to afford to pay up to R900 rent per 
month (Tissington, 2014). There is high demand of affordable housing in 
the inner city. It is estimated that about 3 000 units provide 
accommodation for low income households in the inner city (SERI, 2013).  
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Figure 1-4: Map of Location of income groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Planact and CUBES (2007) 
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meet the demand (ibid.). Planact/ CUBES (2007) stipulates that there has 
been little direction and policy about housing for the poor living in the inner 
city.  
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1.4 Aim and objectives 
COJ developed BBP in 1999 with the aim of improving the quality of low 
income city residents who live in bad buildings, recover the debt in terms 
of taxes and rates from outstanding buildings and to turn bad buildings into 
viable economic assets (COJ, 2010). Several companies have 
implemented the programme with the aim to provide decent and affordable 
housing in the inner city. The overall aim of this research is to determine 
whether the BBP has met its strategic requirement of providing decent and 
affordable housing to low-income households living in the inner city.  
 
 
1.5 Main research question and sub-questions 
To understand how Bad Building Programme as an affordable housing 
programme has performed, it is necessary to evaluate its implementation. 
To achieve the research objective, this research report addresses the 
following question: How has the Bad Building Programme performed to 
alleviate low-income housing in the inner city? To respond effectively to 
this question, the following sub-question is intended to unpack and help to 
realise the research question: Assess whether BBP has delivered 
affordable housing for low-income people living in the inner city. 
 
 
1.6 Brief research methodology 
The objective of this research is to determine whether the BBP has met its 
strategic requirement of providing decent and affordable housing to low-
income households living in the inner city of Johannesburg. This objective 
will be implemented by collection and analysis of empirical data. The 
research strategy for this research is a case study. Case study research 
answers the questions “how and why” and this questions are exploratory 
and descriptive (Yin, 2009). The researcher in the case study observes the 
characteristics of individual units and “probe deeply and to analyse 
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intensively the multifarious phenomenon that constitute the life cycle of the 
unit” (Biggam, 2008:83). 
 
Generally, case studies are considered to be a qualitative in nature and 
not quantitative (Biggam, 2008). Qualitative research is a research 
whereby the researcher does an in-depth and explorative study with the 
aim to investigate and interpret the phenomenon (ibid.). Bell (2005) cited 
in Biggam (2008) explains that qualitative is concerned in understanding 
individuals and seek insights and not statistics. As a result, this research is 
qualitative.  
 
In the process of collecting data, this research focuses on gathering 
qualitative data. There are many ways of collecting data, such as 
interviews, secondary data, observation and questionnaires. Weiss (1975) 
mentions that there are alternative ways of conducting interviews, such as 
use of records, mail/ e-mail questionnaires, telephone surveys, group 
interviews or participation observation. This study uses face-to-face 
interviews as a data collection technique. The interviews are conducted 
with different stakeholder who participated in the BBP.  
 
 
1.7 Structure of the research 
Chapter one introduces and gives the overview of the context of the study. 
It provides introduction, background of BBP, problem statement, overall 
aim and objectives of this research, the main research question and sub-
questions of this study. Chapter two provides conceptual and theoretical 
framework for this research. It defines affordable housing, measures of 
affordable housing. Additionally, the chapter elaborates on how South 
Africa is providing affordable housing for low income households. The 
chapter further explains how other countries and cities are providing 
affordable housing for low income households in order to address the 
housing backlog.  
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Chapter three provides the overview of the study area by providing brief 
context of the inner city of Johannesburg. Chapter four presents the 
research methods adopted for this research. The chapter discusses the 
research strategy which is the case study. The chapter also provides 
techniques for data collection, framework for analysis and potential 
problems that this research may encounter. The chapter also highlights 
the limitation to this research. Chapter five presents and discusses the 
findings from the interviews. The final chapter, chapter six provides the 
conclusion and summarises the findings. The conclusion will be based on 
the research objectives and the main research question.  
 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the background of BBP, problem statement, 
main research question and sub-questions. The chapter has indicated that 
the inner city of Johannesburg has high low income population. The inner 
city has limited decent and affordable housing for the people earning less 
than R3 500 per month. Provision and accessibility of affordable housing 
is a major challenge in the city. The majority of the low income households 
are living in bad buildings. The number of policy and programmes has 
been developed to address the housing backlog. 
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2. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Housing is a basic need that has a profound impact on social, health and 
economic productivity (Anofojie et al., 2013). There are growing 
international concerns over the housing conditions in the cities of 
developing countries (ibid.). It is estimated that in developing countries, 
over a billion people live in inadequate quality housing (Awake, 1988; UN 
– Habitat, 2006 cited in Anofojie et al., 2013). In its Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, the United Nations (1949: 5, 6) states that 
“everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, 
medical care and necessary social services”. 
 
UN-HABITAT (2003) states that many cities in both developed and 
developing countries are faced with shortage of housing for the low 
income population. The majority of urban poor are living in unsafe sub-
standard housing (ibid.). Provision of affordable housing is tremendous 
task faced by many governments (Chen et al., 2006). Cities are faced with 
the challenges of providing adequate and affordable housing for low 
income households. As a result, many countries like South Africa have 
developed policies, concepts and programmes in an attempt to tackle this 
challenge. Choguill (2007:145) suggests several ways in which 
governments can intervene to reduce housing challenges in the urban 
areas: 
“First, governments can build residential units and rent them at full 
or subsidized rates, or give them to recipients. Second, government 
can take steps to lower the price of housing, making it more 
affordable to residents. Third, governments can improve the 
workings of the market to facilitate home ownership among citizens 
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through steps as making mortgages and other home loans more 
readily available or through improvements to the access to 
residential land”. 
 
Due to high costs of land, high demand of housing closer to places of work 
and schools, and insufficient provision of affordable housing in cities, low 
income people find it difficult to buy or rent decent houses (Zhang and 
Hashim, 2011). They are forced to stay in informal settlements/slums or 
sub-standard housing (Ram and Needham, 2016). Zhang and Hashim 
(2011) point out it is the responsibility of governments to ensure a fair 
distribution of affordable housing in their respective countries. Quigley and 
Raphael (2004:208) ask the most important question “what can be done to 
make housing more affordable”? 
 
The focus of this chapter is to review the literature on affordable housing 
for low income housing households and how governments have been 
responding to this challenge. The chapter first defines affordable housing 
and how it is measured worldwide. Then the chapter reviews international 
experience in providing affordable housing then reviews South African 
experience.  
 
 
2.2 Defining affordable housing 
There is no standard definition of affordable housing. Chen et al. (2010) 
point out that affordable housing is a widely used term but it is very ill-
defined. The term usually encompasses the provision of low income 
housing and financial assistance to households that cannot afford to build 
or rent houses. Sengupta (2014) stipulates that affordable housing has 
been used synonymously with low cost housing. Urban Research Centre 
(2008:3) in Australia adds that affordable housing has been used 
synonymously with “social, public or low cost” housing. Affordable housing 
is interpreted as the potential of the households to balance the 
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expenditure of its housing and non-housing costs. UN-HABITAT (2003) 
explains that housing is affordable when it allows members of the 
households to access other basic living costs such as education, food, 
health, transport and clothing. 
 
Zhang and Hashim (2011:176) citing Gabriel et al. (2005) define affordable 
housing as “lower cost housing than prevailing market price to meet up 
with the minimum affordability requirements of low-income people”. 
Nguyen (2005:17) mentions that the policy makers and the academics 
broadly define affordable housing in relation to the “economic ability of the 
household to afford housing”. Affordable housing “expresses the challenge 
each household faces in balancing the cost of its actual or potential 
housing on one hand, and its non-housing expenditures on the other, 
within the constraints of its income” (Jewkes and Delgadillo, 2010: 48 
citing Stone, 2006:151). 
 
According to all the definitions above, the overall aim of affordable housing 
is to assist the low income earners to access decent housing without 
experiencing financial hardship (Urban Research Centre, 2008). The 
governments assist low income earners by providing decent and 
affordable housing to this income group which is mostly excluded by the 
private market. In this research, I will use Wiesel et al. (2012:13) definition 
of affordable housing: “housing (market or non-market provided) that is 
rented or purchased at a cost that is not beyond the financial capacity of a 
household” (not more than 30% of the household income) which is 
financed through loans, personal income or public/government subsidies. 
 
 
2.3 Measures of affordable housing 
There are different measures used for affordable housing around the 
world. The following section will discuss several of them before presenting 
my definition that I will use for this research.   
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2.3.1 The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
uses the ratio approach/percentage-of-income, which has become mostly 
used worldwide (Jewkes and Delgadillo, 2010). This is the relationship 
between the household’s income and housing costs4. The mostly used 
threshold ratios are 25, 30, 40 and 50 per cent. HUD explains that a 
household should not spend more than 30 per cent of its annual gross 
income on housing costs.  
 
HUD regards households that spend more than 30 per cent of the annual 
gross income on housing costs as having housing cost burden. Whereas 
households that spend more than 50 per cent of their annual gross income 
on housing costs have “severe housing cost burden”. Jewkes and 
Delgadillo (2010:46) elaborate that HUD measure is “consistent with 
lender ratios for qualifying for a mortgage loan” in America and other parts 
of the world. The HUD percentage-of-income measure of up to 30 per cent 
has been widely acknowledged as affordable (ibid.). 
 
The advantage of this measure is that it is simple to comprehend and easy 
to compute (Jewkes and Delgadillo, 2010). The data needed is always 
readily available. However, this measure is criticised by the fact that it fails 
to take into consideration the cost of living variable (ibid.). Other 
households prefer to spend a larger proportion of their household income 
on housing than other non-housing essentials. The measure does not also 
control the quality of housing over a period of time. Additionally, the 
measure uses present income instead of permanent income. The 
household costs change each year, depending on the costs cut and 
savings made. Jewkes and Delgadillo (2010) explain that permanent 
income is used to project the changes in income for future purposes.  
                                            
4Principal and interests mortgage payments, house insurance, property tax and utility costs 
(water, gas, electricity, sewer) (Jewkes and Delgadillo, 2010). 
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This research is concerned with households living in the inner city of 
Johannesburg that earns R3 500 per month and below. According to this 
measure, housing affordability is determined by the amount of the 
households’ income that goes to housing. The mostly used threshold that 
is considered to be affordable is 30 per cent of the household income. 
122 000 people living in the inner city earn R3 200 per month, it means 
that according to this measure, this income group can only afford 
accommodation that does not cost more than R9605 per month. 
 
 
2.3.2 Residual Income Indicator 
Residual income indicator measures whether the household will be able to 
access non-housing essentials after deducting housing costs. A household 
is regarded to have housing affordability problem if after deducting 
housing costs, it is not able to meet desirable non-housing essentials 
(Chen et al., 2010). The advantage of this measure is that households 
have a preference on the percentage of their income to use on housing 
and non-housing essentials.  
 
For instance, a wealthy household can spent about 80 per cent of its 
income on housing costs and still have superior life style (Chen et al., 
2010). On the other hand, the poorer household can spend 10 per cent of 
their income on housing but still face a huge challenge in accessing non-
housing essentials. For middle income households, Chen et al. (2010) 
citing Hancock (1993) refer to them as “can pay, won’t pay”. These 
families have the ability to pay for their mortgage but could be hindered by 
their personal preferences. This measure is important because it enables 
the policy makers to easily identify their targets which need housing 
assistance (ibid.).  
 
                                            
5The household’s income of R3 200 is multiplied by 0.3 (30 per cent) to arrive at affordable 
monthly income. 
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2.3.3 Price and Expenditure-to-income-indicator 
The price and expenditure-to-income indicator means “the ratio of 
median/mean market price of a standardised housing unit to median/mean 
(either before tax or disposable) household/family income” (Chen et al., 
2010:884). The price-to-income indicator lies in the ability of a household 
to have access to mortgage based on their monthly income. Due to lack of 
access to mortgage, many households cannot afford to purchase a house. 
Also due to high costs of rent, many households cannot afford to rent 
decent apartments. The expenditure-to-income indicator on the other hand 
is used to indicate the affordability of the household after it has attained 
the mortgage (ibid.). Chen et al. (2010) stipulates that the expenditure-to-
income indicator is mostly used to compare different housing markets 
geographically.  
 
The advantage of this measure is that it is simple and straight forward 
(Chen et al., 2010). However, the critique of this measure is that is it 
inequitable (ibid.). It excludes the poorer households. This measure denies 
low income household to have access to mortgage due to low income. 
Even though this is debatable, it is believed to protect the income of 
poorer households so that they could have non-housing consumption after 
housing cost has been deducted (ibid.). 
 
 
2.4 Conceptual framework of affordable housing 
Housing encompasses concepts like safety, comfort, dignity and identity, 
health, social and economic wellbeing for its members. UN-HABITAT 
(2003) stipulates that many countries struggle to provide adequate and 
affordable housing to low income citizens. Nair et al. (2005) state that 
there is no country in the world that is satisfied that housing has been 
delivered to all income groups in the country. Developing countries have 
the most acute housing challenges than developed countries because 
according to the estimates, more than 1 billion people in developing 
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countries are inadequately housed while 100 million are homeless (ibid.).  
Challenges in delivering affordable housing differ from country to country 
depending on the country’s social, political and economic context.  
 
Housing differs from households to households depending on the 
household’s income, culture and the style of living (Nair et al., 2005). This 
will determine the design of the house the household can afford. Houses 
are viewed as part of identity which gives different households a status. 
Sustainable and affordable housing should be “focused on housing 
development that promotes social interaction of individuals and cultural 
enrichment of the community and is aimed to reduce the inequality of 
housing between social classes” (Nair et al., 2005:4430).  
 
Financial capability of households is an important aspect of being able to 
meet the needs of the members of the households. Housing challenges 
are due to poverty and unemployment and financial assistance will not 
help the poor in meeting this need (Nair et al., 2005). However, the 
country should develop programmes and projects that would enable the 
poor to have a source of income so that they would be able to build and 
maintain their houses (ibid.).  “Economic sustainability or affordability of 
housing should be embedded in an economic development strategy, 
which strengthens the economic self-reliance of household members” 
(ibid., 2005: 4430). 
 
 
2.4.1 Legislation: Affordable housing 
Housing legislature is an important and key instrument in achieving a fair 
delivery of affordable housing. The legislation has to be effective to all 
housing providers and those who do not abide by the law should be 
sanctioned or held accountable for their wrong doings. Based on the 
definition of affordable housing, affordable housing is meant for the low 
income households and as a result, should be only distributed to the 
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eligible households. The private developers who receive any form of 
assistance from government to provide affordable housing and do not do 
so should also be held accountable. Affordable housing legislation ought 
to guarantee fair distribution eligible recipients of affordable housing.   
Zhan and Hashim (2011) state that this law should be valid and effective 
thus safeguard and realise the goal of affordable housing.   
 
The affordable housing legislation in South Africa supply housing to the 
citizens and permanent residents. Government’s affordable housing 
legislations include The National Housing Subsidy Scheme (NHSS)known 
as Reconstruction and Development Programme(RDP), People’s Housing 
Process (PHP), Institutional Housing Subsidy (IHS), consolidation housing 
subsidy, Discount Benefit Scheme, the Relocation Assistance Subsidy and 
the National Rental Housing Strategy (NRHS) and Community Residential 
Unit (CRU).  
 
The government supports household which aims to build their own houses 
through PHP (Department of Human settlement, 2012). The PHP enables 
the community to be active in the housing development thus taking 
ownership of the process rather than just being the recipients (Himlin, 
2008).The housing institution (NGOs) assists the communities in 
constructing, planning and implementing their own houses (ibid.).  The aim 
of the PHP is to improve the livelihood of the communities so that the 
community can capitalise on the social capital that has been built up 
(Himlin, 2008).  
 
IHS is paid to the qualified housing institutions to provide subsidised 
houses either by rentals, home ownerships or rent-to-buy options 
(Department of Human settlements, 2012).  This allows the housing 
beneficiaries not to pay the full purchasing price.  The housing 
organisations6 provide housing for the people who earn below R3 500 per 
                                            
6Private developers, government entities or non-governmental (COHRE, 2005). 
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month (COHRE, 2005). The organisation gets a subsidy to construct a 
house and the beneficiary gets the ownership of the house after four years 
(ibid.). If the beneficiary decides to vacate the house before four years, 
s/he will be eligible for another housing subsidy somewhere else (ibid.). 
 
Consolidation housing subsidy applies to people who were given land but 
could not afford to develop build their houses. These are households that 
earn between R1 501 and R3 500 per month. These households receive 
an amount of R16 851- R21 499 depending on the income bracket. 
Discount Benefit Scheme gives people who rented government houses an 
opportunity to have their own houses. The tenants get the discount of 
R7 500 of a selling price. This only applies to tenants who occupied the 
property before 1983.    
 
The NRHS was approved in 2008 to assist low income job seekers in the 
urban areas who require rental accommodation (Department Human 
settlements, 2002). Through the NRHS the department of Human 
settlements has developed a number of public-private rental stocks such 
as Cavendish in the inner city of Johannesburg among others. Like the 
NRHS, the CRU aims to provide affordable rental housing. The CRU 
facilitates the secure and stable rentals for the households earning R800-
R3 500 per month (Human settlements, 2012). The programme covers 
dilapidated, derelict and dysfunctional buildings among other things (ibid.). 
Emergency housing is another government programme which provides 
housing for people who are in the emergency situations (ibid.).  
 
 
2.5 Residential location 
This section explains why people choose different places of residence. 
People may choose residence due to accessibility of basic service and 
infrastructure, close to economic opportunities or close to places of their 
work or children’s schools. Most poor people prefer a good location (lower 
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transport costs, access to economic opportunities and urban services) 
than the quality of housing. Borck et al. (2007:2) add that “individuals 
choose their residence on the basis of a comparison of the utilities they 
obtain across the two regions”. 
 
People move from one place to another or stay in one place for different 
purposes and reasons. Many households move from one place to another 
in pursuit of better life opportunities. Household’s decisions on choice of 
their places of residences are determined by the economic vitality, wages, 
housing affordability and trade-offs between commuting costs and their 
salaries (Borck et al., 2007;Renkow and Hoover, 2000 cited in Greenlee 
and Wilson 2016).  
 
While mobility for middle or high income households signal economic 
growth Greenlee and Wilson (2016) make an interesting point that for low 
income households, it is sometimes seen as a sign of distress 
(unemployment). The households’ choice to stay close to their places of 
work is influenced by housing and transportation costs. Greenlee and 
Wilson (2016) note that the relationship between the two (housing and 
transportation costs) differentials is opposite to each other. While Yang et 
al. (2012) point out that residential location and travel mode is not 
independent but the demands of each consider the other.  
 
Borck et al. (2007) stipulates that new and advanced innovations of 
commuting technologies and reduction in transport costs have made it 
easy for people to commute from one place to another.  The United States 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (2007) found that the largest expenses for 
most households are housing and transportation costs. The cost of 
housing and transportation are determined by the location. Most 
households make the trade-offs when it comes to housing and 
transportation expenses. Other households prefer to spend more on 
housing which is located close to where they work (Jewkes and Delgadillo, 
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2010). While other households prefer to stay far from their places of work 
and spend more on transport costs and less on housing costs (ibid.).  
 
For housing to be affordable, transport and housing costs combined 
together should not cost more than 45 per cent of the household income 
(Litman, 2016). Litman (2016) makes an interesting point that cheap 
house is not really affordable if transport costs are high. People opt to 
spend more on housing and stay in an accessible location that reduces 
the transport cost. People need transport to access work, shops, schools 
and health facilities. Lack of access to transport options reduces the 
chances of access to jobs and increases the transportation costs.  
 
Despite the fact that affordable housing in the city of Johannesburg are on 
the city periphery, South African Cities Network (2012) explains that very 
few are well serviced by necessary infrastructure including transit stops. 
The South African Cities Network (2012) concludes that majority of 
affordable suburbs in Johannesburg have poor access to infrastructure 
and employment opportunities. As a result, this makes it hard for the 
people to have easy access to economic opportunities in the city. 
 
 
2.6 Affordable housing: International review 
Due to high growing urban population and poverty, African cities face the 
major challenges in providing housing for the poor (Croese et al., 2016). 
Many countries have developed housing policies in order to provide 
affordable housing (Urban Research Centre, 2008 cited in Paris, 2007). 
These policies are “concerned with obtaining more housing to rent or buy 
in parts of the market that are unaffordable to low income households, 
using a variety and mix of incentives and regulations” (Urban Research 
Centre, 2008:17). The section looks at three different affordable housing 
projects that were carried out at Australia. 
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2.6.1 Australia 
Australia is an affluent country but there are citizens who cannot afford to 
house themselves. To respond to this challenge, the government of 
Australia developed a housing policy that would assist those who were 
excluded by the housing market. The government of Australia successfully 
designed, developed and financed affordable housing projects. Affordable 
housing in Australia is increasingly delivered by not-for-profit companies to 
help to address the housing backlog to low and moderate income 
households (Wiesel et al., 2012). This is because the government of 
Australia turned to not-for-profit housing companies to help in addressing 
the housing challenges faced by the country. Table 2-1 gives a brief 
summary of social attributes of three projects Barwon, Livingstone and 
Paramount that were carried out at Australian. 
 
Barwon project  
It is located in a metropolitan inner city of a busy commercial strip (Wiesel 
et al., 2012). This was a project of two buildings ranging from two to 
eleven storeys buildings in height. On the ground floor, there was the 
office space, communal room and parking. Other levels were solely for 
residential use which consists of 71 dwelling units. 50 per cent of the 
dwellings units were earmarked for households with moderate income 
while the remaining 50 per cent was for the households who were eligible 
for public housing (low income households as well as those that are 
unemployed). 
 
Each floor was to accommodate both income groups with the aim of 
promoting social integration (Wiesel et al., 2012). This project 
accommodated a mix of different households (low and moderate income) 
together with very low income single people of whom were homeless 
(ibid.). The rents were set in such a way that ensures that all tenants will 
not pay more than 25 per cent of their monthly income. The project was 
carried out by not-for-profit housing company and financed by government 
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(75 per cent), commercial loan (20 per cent) and other equity (5 per cent) 
such as donations (Wiesel et al., 2012). When it came to financial issues, 
rents were set by government to meet the target demand. However, the 
project is still beneficial to the developer and would be more feasible after 
25 year once the loan is paid off (ibid.).     
 
Table 2-1: Social and affordable indicators of affordable projects 
  Barwon Livingstone Paramount 
Social mix Age profile Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Communal 
space 
Meeting room 
and rooftop 
garden  
 
Small outdoor 
play area. 
Several internal and 
external communal 
spaces. 
Affordability Rental 
affordability 
Fixed rent 
designed to draw 
no more than 25% 
of household 
income net of 
CRA7 received. 
Rent proportional 
to income (25–
30%). 
30% of household 
income (includes 
utilities) plus eligible 
CRA. 
Features 
improving 
affordable 
living 
Cross-ventilation 
through building. 
Solar-boosted hot 
water system. 
Cross-ventilation 
(ineffective). 
Utilities included in 
rent. Excellent access 
to shops, services and 
public transport. 
Features 
reducing 
affordable 
living 
Use of driers. Minimum costs 
for gas supply. 
Use of driers. 
Inefficient water 
system. 
None 
Location and 
accessibility 
Character of 
local area 
Inner-city 
commercial area. 
Fast developing 
inner-city 
location. 
Inner-city residential 
area. 
Access to 
public 
transport 
High. High. High. 
Access to 
local 
amenities15 
High. High. High. 
Overall tenants’ 
satisfaction 
Key features 
adding to 
tenant 
satisfaction 
Well-served 
location. 
Rooftop garden. 
On-site cafe. 
Convenient units. 
Location. 
Affordability. 
Quality of 
dwellings and 
appearance of 
project, 
location.  
 
Features 
detracting 
from tenant 
satisfaction 
Lack of parking. Noise; dust; poor 
ventilation. 
Personal security 
issues. 
Lack of parking. 
Lack of parking. 
 
Source: al., (2012:75) 
 
                                            
7Commonwealth Rent Assistance: “fortnightly payment that is available to recipients of 
government pensions or benefits. It is designed to assist recipients to meet the costs of renting 
where those exceed a minimum specified level” (Wiesel et al., 2012:13). 
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Livingstone 
Livingstone is 5km from the CDB “on the edge of an area undergoing rapid 
redevelopment from industrial to residential land use” (Wiesel et al., 
2012:59). It is an 800m² site with two buildings, one 6 storey while the 
other is 8 storey (Wiesel et al., 2012). Both buildings are predominately for 
residential use with small commercial unit (45m²) and are connected to 
each other by external bridge at each floor (ibid.).  
 
The tenants were allocated based on the income-mix policy which applies 
to affordable housing projects (Wiesel et al., 2012). According to the 
policy, one quarter of the dwelling units should be allocated to very low 
income group, while 45 per cent on low income group and the remaining 
30 per cent to moderate income group (ibid.). Rent is changed based on 
the households’ income group at 25 per cent, 27.5 per cent and 30 per 
cent per month. Wiesel et al., (2012) point out that the rents were below 
the market prices but the tenants were charged depending on the income. 
 
Paramount project 
Paramount is located on a low rise residential area in the inner city, 5 
kilometres from the major CBD, 400m from the public transport options 
and 1 km from the commercial centre (Wiesel et al., 2012). The site covers 
approximately 0.15 hectors of land. The project encompasses two 
buildings: one for refurbishment and extension and the other was new 
development of three storey apartment (ibid.).   25 per cent of the tenants 
are low income earners while 75 per cent are on not. All tenants do not 
pay rent (inclusive of all utility charges) of more than 30 per cent of their 
households’ income (Wiesel et al., 2012).  
 
Wiesel et al. (2012) point out that the not-for-profit housing developer 
acquired this site for $3.2 million and the whole construction costs $8.4 
million. 72 per cent was government funded while 28 per cent was funded 
by the developer through commercial bank loan (ibid.). This project 
28 
 
provided affordable housing for low income households living in the inner 
city.    
 
 
2.6.2 Lessons learnt 
For the company to have access to government capital investment, the 
company had to adopt the government’s rules and regulations. With strong 
government policy and regulatory requirements and financial assistance to 
not-for-profit companies, affordable housing in the inner city can be 
realised. The interesting lesson learnt about all these projects was the 
plan of promoting different income groups to live together in the same 
building. This social mix eliminates the possibility of segregation and the 
concentration of low quality environments.  
 
When low income residents and marginalised groups are spatially 
concentrated, there are chances that they may suffer from “area effect” 
(Atkinson and Kintrea, 2002 cited inWiesel et al., 2012). This however, 
“exacerbates their disadvantage by limiting their life-chances in domains 
such as health, education and employment” (Atkinson 2008:23cited in 
Wiesel et al., 2012:91). On the other hand, when different income groups 
are spatially mixed together, the possibility of area effects is reduced. 
 
The tenants in all projects have security of tenure and were assured that 
no evictions will be done during and after the refurbishments of the 
buildings. The rents in all projects were set below the market rates which 
made it easy for low income earners to afford. The affordable housing 
locations shape the environmental, financial and social outcome of the 
area. A well located affordable housing area provides the residents with 
easy access to public transport, amenities, basic services and 
infrastructure and economic opportunities. Affordable housing that is well 
located reduces car dependency as people will be close to services 
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(Wiesel et al., 2012). However, noise, dust and air quality can be of 
concern since these affordable housing is located in inner city.  
 
Genuine public consultation for the development of any development is 
key for the project success. To involve the community at the planning 
stage, explaining and educating them in a language they can understand 
eliminates future resistance that may delay the project (Wiesel et al., 
2012). Not-for-profit companies engaged the community about the 
proposed development took the community inputs into consideration and 
gave them feedback. Another importance of public consultation is to 
mitigate possible local resistance at project inception stage (ibid.). Even 
though the projects were successful, there were risks and complexities 
that the developers encountered (Wiesel et al., 2012).Developers 
encountered issues such as cost overruns, delays in approving some of 
the developments and problems with easements (ibid.).  
 
In summary, this section was to understand how other countries/cities 
have developed and delivered affordable housing to their low income 
residents. This would help to identify the best practice that the SA can 
adopt in delivering affordable housing in future. Reviewing this case study 
will help to realise how other countries have developed and delivered 
affordable housing for their low income residents. Additionally, this will 
raise awareness and inform a possible approach to the planning and 
delivery of affordable housing. 
 
 
2.7 Affordable housing: South Africa 
According to the constitution of the Republic of South Africa, housing is a 
basic human right. Section 26 of the constitution states that: 
 (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
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 (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
 within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
 of this right.  
 (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
 demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
 relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
 evictions. 
 
The constitution is the supreme law in South Africa and it is the 
government’s responsibility to ensure that every right is upheld in the 
country.  IRR (2015) asserts that section 26 of the constitution has created 
an “entitlement syndrome” where by the poor households misinterpret the 
section and think that they have “a right to free house”.  IRR (2015) 
explains that this section means that the government can progressively 
realise the achievement of this right within “its available resources”. 
 
In 2009, the Department of Housing changed to the Department of Human 
Settlements. The aim was to create integrated human settlements where 
people can have all the required services, amenities and infrastructure.  
Furthermore, the department is committed to upgrade informal settlements 
and stimulate growth in affordable housing. Minister of human settlements, 
Lindiwe Sisulu in 2014 announced that people under the age of 40 would 
not get a “free house”.  IRR (2015:3) recorded Lindiwe Sisulu: 
“Our intention in giving free houses was to right the wrongs of the 
past and make sure that we can give our people dignity. And that 
group of people is not the people below the age of 40. You the 
young people have lost nothing to apartheid...None of you are ever 
going to get a house free from me while I live.” 
 
According to the case “Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others (2000)”, in 1999 people were evicted 
from the informal homes in Wallacedene, Kraaifontein, Western Cape. The 
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land they were occupying was earmarked for formal low income housing. 
They took the municipality to court because they wanted the government 
to provide them with proper housing. The Constitutional court ruled that 
the government is obliged to provide shelter for the evictees. Paragraph 
24 of this court case state that:  
 “The right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in 
 isolation. There is a close relationship between it and the other 
 socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights must all be read 
 together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole. The state is 
 obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in 
 extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable 
 housing. Their interconnectedness needs to be taken into account 
 in interpreting the socio-economic rights, and, in particular, in 
 determining whether the state has met its obligations in terms of 
 them”.   
 
Even though the government does not have enough resources to 
immediately meet the need of the people, the constitutional court ruled 
that the government must at least have a plan to fulfil the right (paragraph 
95).    
 “Neither section 26 nor section 28 entitles the respondents to claim 
 shelter or housing immediately upon demand. The High Court order 
 ought therefore not to have been made. However, section 26 does 
 oblige the state to devise and implement a coherent, co-ordinated 
 programme designed to meet its section 26 obligations……..” 
 
In summary and conclusion, the constitutional court made a decision that 
(paragraph 93):  
 “This case shows the desperation of hundreds of thousands of 
 people living in deplorable conditions throughout the country. The 
 Constitution obliges the state to act positively to ameliorate these 
 conditions. The obligation is to provide access to housing, health-
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 care, sufficient food and water, and social security to those unable 
 to support themselves and their dependants. The state must also 
 foster conditions to enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
 equitable basis. Those in need have a corresponding right to 
 demand that this be done”. 
 
Anofojie et al. (2013) citing the United Nations (1996) states that the cost 
of doing nothing about providing adequate housing is detrimental because 
urban slums are potential causes of social and political unrests. This is 
true in countries like SA. On televisions or radios there is always news 
about the protests for better services delivery, poor infrastructure, housing 
and corruption of or dissatisfaction with municipal officials. Most people 
who protest about housing and better services are usually either from the 
informal and low income settlements. The protesters publicly declare that 
the new government (African National Congress-ANC) promised to build 
them houses. As a result, they demand and expect the government to 
build them houses together with better services (electricity, toilets, water). 
 
In 1994, the biggest challenge that was facing the government was the 
provision of housing to the citizens (Wilkinson, 2014). People who need 
and qualify for housing assistance in South Africa are people who are 
earning R0-R3 500 a month because they find it difficult to enter into the 
property market (Department of Human Settlements, 2015). According to 
Charlton (2016) 40 per cent of South African population (2.3 million 
households) earn between R0-R3500 per month and thus qualify for 
housing capital subsidies.  
 
The housing backlog in the urban areas in SA was estimated to 1.3 million 
units in 1990 (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2016). This backlog is 
increasing at the rate of 178 000 units a year (Wilkinson, 2014). Since 
1994, the backlog has increased from 1.5 million to 2.1 million units (IRR, 
2015). According to Statistics South Africa (2015), there will be 3.6 million 
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new households in 2020 of which 55 per cent will earn below R3 500 per 
month and thus increase the housing demand even further. 
 
To provide affordable housing, the government developed, amended, 
adopted and implemented various policies, programmes, guidelines, 
subsidies and incentives. The aim was to provide housing for those who 
could not afford to house themselves. The African National Congress 
(ANC) government enacted its housing policy in 1994 in order to rectify 
apartheid injustices (UN-HABITAT, 2003). The main priority of the policy 
was to increase the number of black poor home ownership (Lemanski, 
2011). Additionally, the government aimed to rectify the apartheid legacy 
where blacks would only rent and live in the townships (UN-HABITAT, 
2003).The government developed the National Housing Subsidy Scheme 
(NHSS) known as Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for 
households earning R0-R3500 per month (COHRE: 2005).  The housing 
delivery through the NHSS provides 25-30m² houses (figure 2-1) with 
running water and electricity to low income households (Lemanski, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2-1: RDP house 
 
Source: South African informal city (2012) 
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Lemanski (2014) records that from 1994 to 2010 approximately 3.25 
million units have been built through RDP initiative. IRR (2015) also adds 
that the government delivered more than 2.5 million units and 1.2 million 
serviced sites. Table 2-2 shows the number of affordable housing that the 
government has delivered from 1994 to 2010 in the country. In 1994/95 
the government delivered nearly 61 000 houses and increased annually. 
In 1997/98 and 1998/99, the housing delivery was at the peak. Even 
though the RDP houses are criticised for being small in size and far from 
economic opportunities and urban services and infrastructure (Lemanski, 
2014; Charlton, 2016), they have provided housing for many poor people 
who could not house themselves. 
 
Table 2-2: Number of houses built from 1994 to 2010 
Year No. of houses 
built 
1994/95 60 820 
1995/96 74 409 
1996/97 129 193 
1997/98 209 000 
1998/99 235 635 
1999/2000 161 572 
2000/01 170 932 
2001/02 143 281 
2002/03 131 784 
2003/04 150 773 
2004/05 148 253 
2005/06 134 023 
2006/07 153 374 
2007/08 146 465 
2008/09 160 403 
2009/10 166 758 
Total 2 376 675 
Source: Politics web (2010) 
 
In responding to RDP critics Lemanski (2011) stipulates that the 
government introduced Breaking New Ground (BNG). Like the RDP, BNG 
is a housing intervention that the government developed for low income 
households. BNG was introduced in 2004 (SERI, 2013; Lemanski, 2011). 
The aim of the BNG was to increase the size of the houses (40m²), 
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promote integrated housing subsidies with rental and bonded houses on 
well-located areas with all basic services and infrastructure (IRR, 2015). 
The subsidy is paid to the developer either to sell or construct the house 
(Human Settlements, 2012). The house is then transferred to a 
beneficiary.  
 
Another important aim of the BNG is to deliver houses close to basic 
services, infrastructure and economic opportunities (Lemanski, 2011).  
Charlton and Kihato (2006:257) add that BNG focus was to create 
sustainable human settlements8 which aim to “alleviate poverty, and 
improve quality of life through creating access to basic services within the 
new settlements”. BNG include informal settlement upgrading, provision of 
land for low income housing in good locations and provision of basic 
services and infrastructure. The BNG commitment is to assess the needs 
of the community then provide security of tenure and basic services for the 
communities thorough either self-help or local contractors (Charlton and 
Kihato). 
 
 
2.8 Challenges in providing affordable housing 
Ram and Needham (2016) conducted a study in India to find out why 
private developers fail to construct houses for low income households in 
urban areas where the need is great. Wiesel et al. (2012) agrees with Ram 
and Needham (2016) that land costs are higher in the cities. The high 
costs of land in the cities will automatically push the housing price even 
higher. The cheaper land which can be suitable for affordable housing is at 
the city periphery.  
 
                                            
8“viable, socially and economically integrated communities that are located in areas allowing 
convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social amenities”  
(Human Settlements, 2015:24) 
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The challenge with the city periphery is that there is lack of employment 
opportunities, basic services and infrastructure (Ram and Needham 2016). 
Another challenge is that most of economic opportunities are in the cities 
and low income people cannot afford to stay far from their places of work 
(ibid.). Another challenge is that low income people do not have access to 
large credit/loans from financial intuitions (ibid.). This prevents this income 
group to participate in the property markets. The private developers stated 
that they take loans with 15-18% interest rate to carry out the projects. As 
a result, they will therefore construct houses for the income groups that 
afford such houses. 
 
Gabriel et al. (2005:14) cited in Urban Research Centre (2008) found that 
“affordability problems are particularly concentrated on low and moderate 
income groups in the private rental market”. Li (2014) describes that 
unstable employment, income inequalities and living conditions are the 
characteristics of people who cannot afford to own or rent a decent house. 
People who usually have unstable jobs and income and as a result cannot 
afford to meet their essential requirement (food, housing, education, 
health) are often regarded as being poor. Li (2014) questions whether 
housing affordability is due to poverty issues and what really accounts for 
housing un/affordability. 
 
Cities of most developing countries have high demand of affordable 
housing and government lack resources to meet this demand (Ram and 
Needham, 2016). Urban Research Centre (2008) explains that even 
though housing affordability is easy to grasp, it is very difficult to 
implement. This is because housing affordability is strongly associated 
with economic ability of a household. Quigley and Raphael (2004) argue 
that economic ability/income is a misleading factor about housing 
affordability. Individuals and or household’s circumstances change over 
time.  
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Even though the above challenges were found in India, they still apply in 
SA. The availability of suitable and well located land for residential use is 
the major challenge in delivering affordable housing. Additionally, supply 
of basic services and infrastructure become a key challenge due to scarce 
resources. COJ (2010) acknowledges that the influx of migrant labour puts 
too much pressure on the limited services and infrastructure. This further 
increases the demand for affordable housing. Even though the 
government of South Africa delivered massive affordable housing in the 
country under the NHSS, the challenges of the sizes and poor structures 
were of concern. 
 
 
2.9 Gentrification  
During the mid-1970s and late 1980s, the inner city experienced white-
flight; institutional capital disinvestment, accelerated decentralisation and 
suburbanisation which contributed toward the physical and urban decay 
(Visser and Kotze 2008). Urban decay is not unique to South Africa but 
has also been witnessed in many cities internationally (Visser, 2002 citing 
Lees, 1994). Even though Visser (2002) stipulates that white flight resulted 
to urban decay, it also provides a place of residence and economic 
opportunities for the low income households.  Mosselson (2017) adds that 
the inner city provides home for black African population mainly consisting 
of South Africans and migrants from around the continent.  
 
When urban areas decay, the place becomes unattractive to tourists, 
investors as well as the residents. Additionally, deteriorated areas and 
abandoned buildings are normal associated with crimes and violence. As 
a result, the City of Johannesburg found it necessary to respond to this 
urban decay. The City of Johannesburg initiated urban renewal 
programmes in order to transform dilapidated and abandoned buildings 
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into economic assets9. The aim of the City was to create the inner city as a 
place where people can live and work in an environment that is safe and 
affordable.  
 
The urban renewal process started in early 2000s and centres on 
attracting businesses and private investors. These investors purchase and 
renovate bad buildings for residential and commercial purposes. 
Mosselson (2017) citing Beall et al. (2000) argue that the City’s interest is 
to achieve Johannesburg as World class city instead of creating 
employment, poverty alleviation strategies and assisting the informal street 
traders living in the inner city. The urban renewal is linked to the process 
of gentrification. Mosselson (2017) citing Murray (2008) views 
regeneration as a process of iteration of gentrification. This is because the 
private investor’s interests are more privileged than those of the poor. 
 
Gentrification is a “unit-by-unit acquisition of housing which displaces low 
income residents by high-income residents and is independent of the 
structural condition, architecture, tenure, or original cost level of the 
housing” (Visser, 2002:420 citing Kotze, 1998). Visser and Kotze (2008) 
point out that gentrification in South Africa emerged in two phases. The 
first phase emerged in 1980s to early post-apartheid years. While the 
second emerged in 2000s as a result of urban renewal or regeneration. 
Visser and Kotze (2008) argue that the second phase involves the state 
interventions.  
 
The downside of gentrification is that it leads to evictions and 
displacement of the low income households due to rising housing 
expenses/rental. In order to create space for residential and commercial 
development Reitzema (2015) adds that urban renewal displaces the low 
income households. There was massive evictions and displacement of low 
income households that occupied bad buildings prior to purchase in the 
                                            
9 Trendy restaurants, shops, office space as well as residential units.  
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inner city of Johannesburg. The displacement also occurred as results of 
rental increase which became unaffordable to some of the occupiers 
(Mosselson, 2017). Furthermore, the City Improvement Districts10 (CIDs) 
exacerbated the displacement of the unwanted population11 (Mosselson, 
2017).  
 
Gentrification does not only lead to evictions and displacement but also 
stimulate economic growth and rehabilitate the existing property. Reitzema 
(2015) stipulates that gentrification a back to the city movement of not 
people but also capital. Reitzema (2015:20-21) citing Smith (1979:151-
152) further stipulates that:  
 “Gentrification is part of a larger redevelopment process dedicated 
 to the  revitalisation of the profit rate. In the process, many 
 downtowns are being converted into middle-class 21  playgrounds 
 replete with quaint markets restored townhouses, boutique 
 rows, yachting marinas and Hyatt Regencies. These very  visual 
 alterations to the urban landscape are not at all an accidental 
 side-effect of temporary economic disequilibrium but are as  rooted 
 in the structure of capitalist society as was advent of 
 suburbanisation”. 
 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed affordable housing as the main framework for 
this study. The chapter has also established that the criteria for assessing 
whether housing is affordable or not. For housing to be affordable, there 
                                            
10 “These are local variations of the Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) which have become 
commonplace in cities across the United States and Britain and which assist in driving 
entrepreneurial urbanism and the privatisation of public space. In South African cities, CIDs are 
criticised for enhancing private control of urban areas and further fragmenting already unequal 
and divided urban landscapes. Their use of privatised cleaning, maintenance and security services 
entrenches differential access to resources and amenities and makes the disparities between 
areas controlled by private interests and those yet to attract investment even more stark” 
(Mosselson, 2017:1284). 
11 Beggars and homeless 
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are two important areas that determine the affordability of a household. 
These are financial capacity of a household to afford housing and the 
location of affordable housing in relation to access to job/economic 
opportunities as well as access to basic services and infrastructure. From 
the literature reviewed, it is clear that lack of affordable housing is not 
unique to SA, but a challenge to other countries as well. Governments 
have developed and implemented various policies and programmes in 
order to address the affordable housing challenges.  
 
The government of South Africa has a strong commitment to deliver 
affordable housing in the country. National housing programmes have 
played a major role in providing low income housing in the country. There 
are many housing programmes that the government has developed to 
assist low income household to access decent housing. The government 
indeed have delivered over 3 million housing units to low income 
households in order to combat housing challenges in the country. 
However, the houses are mostly located at the city periphery, far from 
economic opportunities, basic services and urban infrastructure. People 
prefer to stay close to where they work to avoid incurring high transport 
costs. Despite the government initiatives to combat housing challenges in 
the country, majority of low income residents in the inner city are still faced 
with housing challenges and do not have many alternatives. 
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3. JOHANNESBURG: INNER CITY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the history of the inner city of Johannesburg. The 
chapter will also look at the population dynamics, Socio-economic 
characteristics and housing conditions of the inner city of Johannesburg to 
better understand who lives in the inner city, how much they earn and how 
their living conditions are.  
 
 
3.2 Affordable housing: Inner city of Johannesburg 
Cities are places where diversity of individuals comes together, places of 
great creativity and places of anonymity (Burzynski, 2012). The urban 
population growth is higher in developing countries as people migrate to 
cities with an expectation of finding jobs and better services than in the 
rural areas (Silitshena et al, 2005). There is an international concern about 
how the cities of the south deal with their vulnerable urban population 
(Burzynski, 2012). Silitshena et al. (2005:26) point out that “once 
governments accept the responsibility of the welfare of their people, they 
try to provide housing for those who could not afford to do so”. 
 
Large corporations vacated their premises in 1970s and 1980s to the 
north. Additionally, “first-time home-owner subsidies” encouraged white 
families to buy homes in the suburbs (ibid.). Formal retailers also vacated 
to the north to open retail stores and supermarkets close to where their 
clientele resided. Many property owners abandoned their buildings and 
moved to the suburbs of north of Johannesburg (Bethlehem, 2013). 
Around the same time, there was demand of housing for black people in 
the city (COJ, 2006). This was because there was severe housing 
shortage in their segregated areas and they also needed places close to 
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where they work (ibid.). Additionally, there was also an influx of immigrants 
who were looking for places to stay in the inner city (ibid.). Landlords of 
empty buildings took advantage and accommodated tenants who were 
looking for accommodation. The landlords took advantage of the situation 
and increased rents because of lack of alternative accommodation. 
Burzynski (2012) states that increased rent lead to overcrowding. More 
tenants occupied small rooms as a strategy to share rents thus lower 
individual rent (ibid.). 
 
Many of these abandoned formal commercial and residential buildings 
became numerous informal small dwelling units which accommodate the 
urban poor and low income city earners 12(Few et al., 2004). Overcrowding 
increase pressure on limited infrastructure and maintenance costs 
(Burzynski, 2012). Due to concentration of economic activities, good 
transport networks in the inner city, the city will continue to experience the 
huge influx of dynamic people in search for the city’s opportunities (COJ, 
2007).  
 
To address the dilapidated buildings and housing backlog for low income 
group, COJ developed few policies and programmes: 
I. Transitional Housing Programme: This was developed to tackle the 
homelessness in the city in the early 1990s (SERI, 2013). The aim 
was to provide temporary accommodation (6 months) for individuals 
earning more than R450 but less than R1 250 per month and 
families earning more than R450 but less than R2 500 per month.  
II. Inner City Regeneration Strategy (ICRS): By late 1990s government 
developed and adopted ICRS with an aim to “clean-up” and tackle 
“crime and grime” in the city (Wilson, 2011). The main was to 
encourage the private sector to invest and stimulate the property 
value. The hijacked buildings were to be closed down and sold to 
                                            
12Formal and informal workers: car guards, taxi drivers, cleaners, security guards, informal 
traders, domestic workers etc. (SERI, 2013) 
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private developers who would upgrade for both commercial and 
residential purposes (ibid.).  
III. Bad/Better Building Programme (BBP): The policy was developed 
in 1999 (SERI, 2013). The aim was to sell bad buildings to private 
developers and individuals to upgrade and renovate them for 
residential use mostly for low income earners (Few et al., 2004). 
IV. Inner City Property Scheme (ICPS): Developed in 2007 to replace 
BBP and was launched in 2011 (SERI, 2013).  
 
Non-profit organisations such as Madulammoho Housing Association and 
Johannesburg Housing Company among others renovated and converted 
office buildings into residential stock. Additionally, private companies 
(Affordable Housing Company, City Property, Jika Housing, and Jozi 
Housing) and few individuals also converted and renovated old office 
buildings into affordable residential units. The government also provides 
social housing grant to create more subsidised rental units (Bethlehem, 
2013).The overall quality of housing in the inner city differs from company 
to company. There is high demand of housing due of close proximity to 
economic opportunities as tenants save time and transport costs (ibid.). 
 
Even though both the private and public sector participate in providing low 
cost housing in the city, there is still large demand of low income housing 
in the inner city. In 2005, there was a shortage of 18 000 units and only 
3 000 units provide housing for the households earning less than R3 200 
per month (Wilson, 2011). The decent private sector accommodation is 
unaffordable for the low income households living in the city (SERI, 2013). 
The low income households therefore, opt to stay in bad buildings 
because there are no other alternatives at their disposal.  
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3.3 Historical setting 
The inner city of Johannesburg is located in the Republic of South Africa 
within the smallest and richest province, Gauteng. During apartheid, 
Johannesburg inner city as well as other areas in the country was 
governed by segregation laws such as the influx control laws and Group 
Area Act which prevented or restricted the movement of blacks, coloureds 
and Indians (Landau, 2006). Under these laws blacks, coloureds and 
Indians were expected to carry passbooks to enter the inner city and were 
not allowed to live in the inner city (ibid.).  In the late 1970s, there was a 
housing shortage for the blacks, coloureds and Indians at their segregated 
areas (Simone, 2001). Even though the segregation laws were not yet 
abolished, the blacks began slowly moving to the inner city (ibid.).     
 
During the 1970s, the whites started to move out of the inner city to the 
northern suburbs. This led to the deterioration of economic and physical 
fibre of the inner city. In 1990s many buildings were abandoned and this 
led to increased crime, squatting and hijacking of buildings, social disorder 
and poor management of the inner city. Compared to other municipalities 
in South Africa, Johannesburg is more developed and the capital of the 
richest province (IDP, 2013/2014). The inner city is characterised by urban 
poverty, inequality and social exclusion (COJ 2011). Unemployment is a 
contributing factor to increasing poverty and inequality (ibid.).   
 
The City of Johannesburg has seven administrative regions. The inner city 
of Johannesburg is part of administrative Region F (figure 3-1). Region F 
covers an area of 240.2 km² and is located towards south eastern side of 
the City (COJ, 2010). The inner city is a historic, economic and cultural 
centre of Johannesburg (COJ 2007). There are large taxi ranks, main bus 
terminals and railways stations in the city which operate both nationally 
and internationally. 
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Figure 3-1: Map of Johannesburg administrative regions 
 
Source: COJ (2009) 
 
Region F consists of lower to upper income residential areas, industrial 
nodes, world class theatres, important facilities, places of attraction and 
good transport networks (COJ, 2007). It shares the border with region E 
and B on the north, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality on the eastern 
side, region D and G on the western side and Midvaal Local Municipality 
on the south (ibid.). According to COJ (2007) the inner city is the densest 
part of the region and covers Yeoville and Braamfontein in the north to 
Marshalltown and Benrose in the south, and Vrededorp and Fordsburg in 
the west to Jeppestown, Bertams and Troyeville in the east” (figure 3-2).  
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Figure 3-2: Map of Johannesburg inner city 
 
Source: COJ (2007) 
 
The great landmarks of the inner city are the Nelson Mandela Bridge, 
Carlton Centre, Hillbrow tower, Constitutional hill and the Diagonal Street 
(COJ, 2007). The inner city functions as business nodes, residential 
neighbourhood, transportation hub and host of many local, regional and 
international office accommodations.   
 
 
3.3.1 Population dynamics 
According to JDA (2015) the inner city has the estimated population of 265 
292 residents. The Inner city has experienced significant population 
growth of 23 per cent and households growth of 6 per cent from 2001 to 
2011 (figure 3-3).  In 2001, the population was approximately 215 979 with 
82 968 households (JDA, 2015). In 2011 the population increase to 
approximately 265 292 with 87 772 households (ibid.).HSRC (2013) 
explains that population increase is due to migrants from other parts of the 
country and outside the country who come to the city for better 
opportunities.   
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Figure 3-3: Inner city population and households’ growth 
 
Source: JDA (2015) 
 
 
3.3.2 Socio-economic characteristics 
The inner city has vast and diverse business and employment 
opportunities for all income groups as it is located between the affluent 
northern and the southern suburbs (COJ, 2010). The economy in the inner 
city is unbalanced and it is characterised by changing patterns of 
investment (JDA, 2015). According to 2011 national population census, 
approximately 122,000 people (almost half of the people living in the inner 
city) are earning less than R3 200 per month. The inner city is a home to 
several head offices of major co-operations, banks, insurance and mining 
companies (COJ, 2010). The inner city is only perceived as a “money-
making machine” for majority of inner city residents and users as it is only 
their place of work and making money.  
 
Johannesburg is the economic hub of Africa and therefore, attracts diverse 
people from other provinces and the rest of the world. According to 
Hornberger (2011) the majority of the people living in the inner city are 
migrants. These migrants continue to come into the inner city with the 
hope to find better economic opportunities than their places of origin. 
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Frasier and Cox (2005) stipulate that the city does not have sufficient work 
opportunities as people think especially for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labours. There is significant large number of no income households in the 
inner city (figure 3-4). 
 
Figure 3-4: Annual household income 2011 
 
Source: JDA (2015) 
 
HSRC (2013) states that usually when people find it difficult to secure jobs 
in the formal sector, they opt to work in the informal sector. Compared to 
other regions in Johannesburg, region F has the highest rates of informal 
employment. Despite the large number of no income households, the 
inner city has substantial middle and high income households. HSRC 
(2013) stipulates that many of low income households living in the inner 
city spend most of their income on accommodation and food. 
 
 
3.3.3 Affordable housing supply 
Due to the capital flight to the north, the city experienced rapid buildings 
and residential degradation. There is high demand of housing and 
insufficient supply of affordable housing in the city (Bethlehem, 2013). 
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Table 3-1 summaries housing supply of low income housing in the inner 
city.  
 
Table 3-1: housing supply in the inner city of Johannesburg 
Formal private rental • Large formal private rental providers (e.g. 
JPOMA members 
• Estimated 55 000 units under management 
• Rentals: R750-R5 00+ /mth (excl service 
charges) 
Social housing • Social housing institutions (JHC, JOSHCO, 
Madulamoho) 
• Estimated 4 000 units under management 
• Rentals: R750-R 2 500/ (generally incl. of service 
charges) 
Small scale landlords • Generally semi-formal sub-letting arrangement 
(mainly sectional title units)- sub-letting of space 
• Number not clear 
• Rentals:R500-R2 000/mth (bed, doorway, shared 
rooms etc) 
Slumlords • Formally owned but poorly managed and over-
crowded rental stock 
• Number not known 
• Rentals not know but likely in line with formal 
private (noting significant sub-letting) 
Informal • Occupied non-residential spaces- may have 
some community structure. 
• Number not known 
• Rentals not known but case studies suggest very 
low i.e.<R500/mth 
JDA (2016:42) 
 
JDA (2016) acknowledges that there is a limited supply of affordable 
housing in the inner city and these force many low income households to 
live in overcrowded and dilapidated buildings (bad buildings). SERI (2013) 
stipulates that the gap between the demand for low income 
accommodation and the supply in the inner city is very acute. JDA (2016) 
reports that the past six years, about 50 000 new housing dwellings were 
delivered in the inner city through the rehabilitation of old residential 
buildings and the conversion of vacant office buildings. However, most of 
these dwellings were for the middle income group but the low income 
household could not afford the rent (ibid.).  
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Housing providers such as JOSHCO and Madulamoho supply 
accommodation as low as R700 per month but they are not able to meet 
the demand. JDA (2016:8) admits that “the demand for affordable housing 
outstrips supply of suitable housing for the poor in Inner City 
Johannesburg”. There is lack of reliable and consistent data about the 
demand of affordable housing units in the inner city. JDA (2016) stipulates 
that COJ aims to provide housing for all and create a sustainable 
settlement and improve the livelihoods of the inner city residents. 
 
COJ’s Department of Housing aim to create the inner city as a “resilient, 
liveable, sustainable urban environment – underpinned by infrastructure 
supportive of a low-carbon economy, which is premised on the 
development of sustainable human settlements, where the City 
establishes greater capacity to absorb new entrants and existing residents 
into a functioning housing system, where all can find a place to live 
(irrespective of their incomes), that offers good quality of life and is 
connected to the requisite social amenities” (JDA, 2016:2). 
 
Figure 3-5 shows that the majority of inner city residents are rentering. 
From the same figure, we can see that the percentage of renters is on the 
rise from 76 per cent in 2001 to 92 per cent in 2011. According to SERI 
(2013) many of low income inner city residents work as taxi drivers, 
domestic workers, informal traders, cleaners, car and security guards and 
cannot afford buying or renting other apartments. 
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Figure 3-5: Inner city housing market 
 
Source: JDA (2015) 
 
Despite bad buildings, there are few housing alternatives for low income 
households living in the inner city. Table 3-2 summarises subsidised rental 
housing in the inner city for low income households.  
 
Table 3-2: subsidised rental housing in the inner city 
Housing type Income per month Rental per month 
Communal housing units <R3 500 R450 -R800 
Community residential 
units / family units 
R800-R2 500 R200-R800 
Transitional housing 
units 
R450-R1 250 for individuals; 
<R2 500 per household 
R150-R450 per unit, 
R90-R165 per bed 
Shelters R0-R450 R0-R90 per bed 
Social housing units <R3 500 R800-R1500 
Source: SERI (2013) 
 
According to COHRE (2005) the cheapest unsubsidised accommodation 
is R850 per month excluding services charges such as electricity and 
water. While adding water and electricity charges, COHRE (2005) 
estimates that the renting cost would be around R1 000. Realistically, 
approximately 122,000 people living in the city earning less than R3 200 
per month are likely not to afford unsubsidised accommodation in the inner 
city. Table 3-3 summarises the increase of low income households and 
their potential monthly rental affordability in the inner city. 
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Table 3-3: Household income and monthly rental affordability 
Monthly 
household 
income (R) 
Monthly 
rental 
affordabilit
y (R) (30% 
of income 
spent on 
housing) 
Number of 
households in  the 
inner city 
Increase or 
decrease in 
the number 
of 
households 
Percent
age (%)  
change 
 2001 2011  
None R0 6 919 13 778 6 859 99% 
1 – 400 0 – 120 826 1 099 273 33% 
401 - 800 121 – 240 2 635 1 786 - 849 32% 
801 – 1 600 241 – 480 5 040 4 721 - 319 6% 
1 601 –  3 200 481 – 960 5 095 12 474 7 379 44% 
TOTAL  20 515 33 858 13 343 65% 
Source: SERI (2015:51) 
 
Berea, Hillbrow and Joubert Park have a large number of medium to high 
rise residential buildings with many buildings experiencing decay (COJ, 
2010). JDA (2015) adds that these areas are the most densely populated 
in South Africa. Additionally, these settlements have hijacked buildings, 
illegal slumlords and stressed public environment due to high population 
density and lack of management (ibid.).  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has presented a case study area. The chapter has also 
discussed affordable housing and historical settings of city of 
Johannesburg. The chapter discussed population dynamics, housing and 
socio-economic background of the area. The focus was on how low 
income residents in the inner city are accommodated and understand their 
living conditions. The study area has a diverse low income population and 
range of economic opportunities which makes to study how people are 
housed in the inner city of Johannesburg. The inner city of Johannesburg 
makes it possible to get an insight on how people choose different places 
to live based on the monthly income. 
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4. UNDERSTANDING BAD BUILDINGS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the research methods that will be 
used to collect and analyse data for this research. The chapter employs 
qualitative method responding to the main research question: How has the 
Bad Building Programme performed to alleviate low income housing in the 
inner city? This chapter outlines the research strategy that this research 
undertook to address the research matter above. The chapter also 
provides data collection techniques, frameworks for data analysis, ethical 
consideration and limitations to this research. 
 
 
4.2 Research strategy 
Biggam (2008) stipulates that the label attached to the research does not 
matter, but what matters is whether the strategy is appropriate for the 
research. Research strategy is “the general plan of how the researcher will 
go about answering the research questions” (Saunders et al., 2000:92 
cited in Biggam, 2008:220). There are several ways of carrying out 
research. These include case studies, surveys, action, historical 
experiments, and participatory observation (ibid.). The research strategy 
for this research report is a case study. The researcher in the case study 
observes the characteristics of individual units such as a school, a 
company or a community.  
 
The purpose of observation in a case study is to “probe deeply and to 
analyse intensively the multifarious phenomenon that constitute the life 
cycle of the unit” (Biggam, 2008:83). Case study is used to contribute to 
knowledge by enabling the researcher to investigate and understand a 
complex phenomenon (Yin, 2009). Generally, case studies are considered 
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to lend themselves to qualitative rather than quantitative research 
(Biggam, 2008). Qualitative research is research whereby the researcher 
does an in-depth and explorative study with the aim to investigate and 
interpret the phenomenon (ibid.).  
 
Qualitative research studies things in their natural settings with the aim to 
interpret or make sense of the situation (ibid.). Bell (2005) cited in Biggam 
(2008) stipulates that qualitative is concerned in understanding individuals 
and seek insights. The reason for the use of case study in this research 
was to investigate deeply and explain the outcomes of the BBP.  Yin 
(2009) stipulates that case study research answers the questions “how 
and why” and these questions are exploratory and descriptive. This 
research aims to answer the question “how” with the role of being 
explanatory and descriptive. The assessment of whether BBP has 
alleviated low income housing in the inner city is based on qualitative 
method. As qualitative research is descriptive in nature and focuses on 
experiences and opinions, this research pays particular attention on the 
officials and independent researchers’ views, opinions and experience on 
the BBP. 
 
 
4.3 Data collection 
There are several ways of collecting data, such as interviews, secondary 
data, observations and questionnaires. In case studies, Yin (2009) 
stipulates that evidence/data can be collected in six different ways: 
archival records, direct observation, documents, interviews, participant 
observation and physical artefacts. Table 4-1 shows the strengths and 
weaknesses of each source. 
 
Biggam (2008) highlights that using more than one method of data 
collection helps the researcher to triangulate the results. Triangulation 
helps the researcher to get more description of what they are looking at 
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(Geertz, 1973 cited in Biggam, 2008). There are several alternatives that 
the researchers use to conduct the interviews. These alternatives include 
the use of records, mail or e-mail questionnaires, telephone surveys, 
group interviews or participation observation (Weiss, 1975). Interviews are 
appropriate for collecting qualitative data because interviews provide 
essential source of information (Williman, 2011).  
 
Yin (2003) cited in Biggam (2008) believes that interviews provide 
essential information in a case study simply because case studies involve 
people. The interviews provide information to clarify complex situation. 
The advantage of interviews is that they give the interviewee to express 
and explain their views. There are different kinds of case study interviews:  
in-depth, focused, structured interviews (Yin, 2009). An in-depth interview, 
the interviewer may ask the interviewee about the facts and their opinions. 
The interviewer may also allow the interviewee to say his own insights 
about the fact of the matter (Yin, 2009). An in-depth interview takes place 
over a period of time (ibid.).  
 
Yin (2009) elaborates that it is essential to support the interview data with 
other information from different sources. This is important because the 
interviewee can give biased or inaccurate responses. Sometimes the 
interviewee may not fully recall exactly what happened or give false 
statements involuntarily. Documentation as a source of evidence includes 
written reports, administrative reports -proposal, internal records and 
progress reports (ibid.). Yin (2009) acknowledges that these documents 
are not always acute and therefore, must be carefully used.  
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Table 4-1: Strengths and weaknesses of six sources of evidence 
Source of evidence Strengths  Weaknesses  
Documentation   Stable- can be review repeatedly 
 Unconstructive-not created as a result of case study 
 Exact-contains exact names, references, and details of 
an event 
 Broad coverage-long span of life time, many events and 
many settings  
 Irretrievability-can be difficult to find 
 Biased selectivity, if collection in 
incomplete 
 Reporting bias-reflects (unknown) bias of 
author 
 Access-may be deliberately withheld 
Archival records  [same as those for documentation] 
 Precise and usually quantitative 
 [same as those for documentation] 
 Accessibility due to privacy reason 
Interviews  Targeted-focuses directly on case study topics 
 Insightful-provides perceived casual inferences and 
explanations 
 Bias due to poorly articulated questions 
 Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
 Reflexivity-interviewee give what the 
interviewer want to hear  
Direct observation  Reality-covers events in real time 
 Contextual-covers context of “case” 
 Time consuming 
 Selectivity-broad coverage difficult without 
a team of observers 
 Reflexivity-event may proceed differently 
because it is being observed 
 Cost-hours needed by human observers 
Participant 
observation 
 [same as those for Direct observation] 
 Insightful into interpersonal behaviour and motives 
 [same as those for Direct observation] 
 Bias due to participant observer’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical artifacts  Insightful into cultural features 
 Insightful into technical operations 
 Selectivity 
 Availability  
Yin (2009:102)
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Biggam (2008:223) explains that interviewing different stakeholders allows 
the researcher for “cross-comparison of responses, encouraging different 
perspectives of similar issues to emerge”. The researcher collected 
qualitative data using face to face interviews with an aim to learn whether 
the BBP met its objective of providing affordable housing to low income 
households living in the inner city. The researcher made use of 
documentation as another sources of evidence. All documents used were 
supplied by the interviewees. The interviews were conducted with the 
officers at COJ Department of Housing and at Inner City Property Scheme, 
former executive Director at Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), 
independent researcher/consultant who worked in bad building strategy 
and former researcher at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and 
Socio-economic rights Institute of South Africa (SERI). The list of 
interviews is provided in appendix 1.  
 
The researcher had the face to face interviews except for the former 
executive director at Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP). Due to 
distance, the interview guidelines and the response were done through e-
mails. The interviewees were given the opportunity to explain how they 
were involved, what were their thoughts, the challenges and successes 
and what could have been done differently. The interview used structured 
questionnaires which were prepared well in advance. The interview 
questions are provided in appendix 2. The questionnaires were e-mailed 
to the interviewees well in time before the interview. This was to give the 
interviewee time to prepare and make sure the interviewees were clear of 
what the researcher required from them and prepared for the interview. 
This was to give the interview a clear direction.  
 
The researcher used a combination of open-ended and close-ended 
questions. Qualitative interviewing, using open-ended questions 
encourage meaningful and thoughtful responses. The advantage of open-
ended questions is that the interviewee is not confined to limited 
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responses. The interviewee has a chance to express, explain and expand 
on their views and answers.  
 
 
4.4 Frameworks for data analysis 
This research is qualitative and the data collected was analysed in 
descriptive technique. The data collected was analysed by what Wolcott 
(1994) cited in Biggam (2008) describes as a process of “description, 
analysis and interpretation”. Biggam (2008:117) explains that this method 
involves “collecting interview data, describing it (i.e. interview transcription 
and simple written statements of who said what), followed by the 
interpretation of the descriptions (=analysis)”. Figure 4-1 shows the 
graphical approach by Wolcott (1994) that this research will adopt to 
analyse the data collected.  
 
Figure 4-1: Qualitative data analysis process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Biggam (2008:120) 
Qualitative analysis 
process 
Collect data (interview 
and documents) 
Describe data 
Group themes and issues 
Perform analysis i.e. 
interpret what is happening 
59 
 
After data collection, all the findings were described then grouped into 
relevant themes and analysed. The importance of working with qualitative 
analysis paradigm is explained by Bogdan and Biklen (1982:154) cited in 
Biggam (2008:120) as “working with data, organising it, breaking it into 
manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what 
is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell 
other”.   
 
 
4.5 Ethical considerations 
Decisions based on ethics in research determine whether the researcher 
takes into account the participant’s needs and concerns (Scheynens et al., 
2003). The research has to be just and protect the participant’s safety, 
dignity and privacy (ibid.). Ethical issues were important to this research. 
The researcher conducted the potential interviewees in advance either by 
e-mails, telephone calls or by going to their places of work to set the 
appointment for the interviews.  The researcher introduced herself and 
made the potential interviewee about the nature of the research and then 
provided them Participation Information Sheet (PIS) (for copy of PIS see 
appendix 3) and consent forms. 
 
The aim of the PIS was to inform the interviewee about the nature of the 
research. The PIS stipulated how much time the researcher aimed to 
conduct the interview. It also made the interviewee that her/his 
participation was voluntary and will not be regarded in anyhow. Before 
conducting the interview, the researcher informed the interviewee about 
the nature of the research and when they agree with the terms of the 
research, they had to sign the consent form.  Scheynens et al. (2003:142) 
defines informed consent as “when a potential participant freely and with 
full understanding of the research agrees to be part of the project”. The 
interviewees signed the consent forms as a sign that they were informed 
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about the purpose and the procedure of the research and willingly agree to 
participate in this research. 
 
 
4.6 Limitations of the study 
Collecting data for this research was problematic in several ways. Firstly 
people were reluctant to participate in the research. They highlighted that 
they were busy at work and could not spare any time to participate in the 
research. Official[s] from Johannesburg Housing Company were 
anticipated to be interviewed but the researcher was denied to interview 
any officials. Secondly, the researcher encountered was the fact that the 
BBP was stopped in 2008. The researcher was denied interview because 
officials who worked in the BBP no longer work in the institutions. Lastly, 
some of the interviewees either took long to respond or gave the 
researcher the appointment for the interview two to four three weeks from 
the contact date. Interviews were conducted between August and 
November. At some point the research was at almost stand still.  Few e-
mails were never responded to by the potential interviewees while some 
bounced back.  
 
Biggam (2008) explains that there are limitations and issues related to 
implementing case studies and usually the researchers are able to 
recognise the limitations in their work. Biggam (2008) further explains that 
the results that the researcher finds provide detailed information, 
experiences and individual perceptions. Additionally, the results provide 
valuable insight information.  However, the results cannot be generalised. 
The results of this research cannot also be generalised. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The research strategy for this study is a case study. This research uses a 
case because case studies allow the researcher to investigate deeply thus 
providing detailed information. Data was collected using in-depth, focused 
and face-to-face interviews. The potential interviewees were selected 
because of their involvement and participation in the BBP. Additionally, the 
report made use of the documents and written reports only provided by the 
interviewees. The research is descriptive and data was analysed in 
accordance to “description, analysis and interpretation” method. All the 
interviews that were conducted went smoothly and the interviewees were 
willing to share their experiences with the researcher. The researcher 
made sure to inform the potential interviewees well in advance about the 
nature of the research. Lastly the chapter outlines the limitations that the 
researcher and constraints that the researcher encounter with carrying out 
the research. 
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5. EVALUATION OF BAD BUILDING 
PROGRAMME 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the findings from case study through the 
interviews conducted with the different stakeholders. The chapter first 
discusses the aims and objectives of the Bad Building Programme (BBP). 
Then the chapter discusses the results from the interviews conducted.  
Lastly the chapter provides the analysis and interpret the findings with the 
aim to respond to the main research question and sub questions. In view 
of this, the chapter augment the analysis of the interview with the findings 
from various documents provided by the interviewees.  
 
 
5.2 Aim of Bad Building Programme 
BBP was developed in 1999 as a mechanism to deal with bad buildings in 
the inner city. According to COJ (2010) a building is classified as a bad 
building if it is abandoned by the owners, hijacked by slumlords and 
squatters, deplorable state, seat of criminals, in arrears in rates and 
services, is derelict and contravene the City’s by-laws and other 
legislation. The main objectives of BBP were to recover debt owed to the 
City, facilitate the urban regeneration in the city, improve the quality of life 
of low income inner city residents and accelerate residential development 
in the inner city (COJ, 2010). The city identified buildings that negatively 
affected the urban fabric and those that were in arrears. These were 
buildings that had social and physical problems and those that were 
dangerous for human habitation.  
 
The aim of the City was to acquire the buildings through legal processes 
and sell them to developers at the discounted market value or price 
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equivalent to the debt. According to SERI (2013) the 2001 inner city 
position paper states that addressing bad buildings was the City’s key 
priority.  Out 10 000 units that needed major attention, 5 000 units were to 
be included in the BBP while 2 000 units were considered to be 
demolished and 3 000 units to be improved (ibid.).  The following section 
looks whether the BBP has provided affordable housing for low income 
households living in the inner city of Johannesburg.  The following section 
looks at the interviews conducted for the purpose of responding to the 
sub-questions and main research question. 
 
 
5.3 Reflecting on findings 
The researcher collected empirical data by interviewing with different 
stakeholders. This section presents findings from the interviews and how 
they responded to addressing main research question and sub-research 
questions. To present the findings from the interviews, the discussion has 
been grouped into themes which are key to this research: Bad Building 
Programme, BBP performance, the constraints and whether affordable 
housing was realised through BBP. The main focus was to assess 
whether BBP achieved its objective of providing decent and affordable 
housing for low income inner city residents thus improving their quality of 
life. 
 
Bad Building Programme (BBP) 
According to respondent A, BBP was the initiative of the City which aimed 
to regenerate the inner city through the redevelopment, renovation and 
regeneration of bad buildings. The objectives of the BBP were to improve 
the buildings, provide safe and legal accommodation and turn slum 
buildings into well managed buildings (respondent C). Respondent C 
further adds that on top of the urban regeneration, the need to upgrade 
bad buildings was also to respond to enormous need for housing as 
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people were moving out of the townships into the inner city (respondent 
C).  
 
The aim was to regenerate the inner city properties (bad buildings) so that 
they become habitable and viable assets again (respondent A, B and C). 
Respondent C mentioned that the City was concerned about the hijacking 
and invasion of buildings. The owners of the buildings could not get the 
invaders out of their buildings even though the buildings were occupied 
illegally or by force and the police could not do much (respondent C).  This 
caused the City to look at the alternatives on how to tackle the situation 
(respondent C). 
 
Respondent C stipulated that the City tackled the bad buildings with the 
City’s by-laws and or through legal processes (court). All the departments 
(health, environment, planning among others) in the City that had the by-
laws which could impact on the building came together to rate the building 
(respondent C). Respondent C stated that water, electricity, rates and 
taxes would not be paid, and this would pile up so much that they costs 
more than the value of the building. The City would put more pressure by 
issuing fines to those who owe the City, and those who could not afford to 
pay would face the evictions (respondent C). Respondent A also 
mentioned that the City also targeted buildings that were dilapidated and 
that were hijacked by either slumlords or urban poor. These buildings 
would be expropriated and then made available for refurbishment through 
public tenders (respondent C).  
 
There was a huge demand for low to medium income housing and 
developers could not build fast enough to respond to the need (respondent 
C). Additionally, there were stressed buildings and developers who badly 
wanted to refurbish these buildings (respondent C). In order for the City to 
respond to these challenges, respondent C stipulated that the City 
provided the developers with the buildings at a discounted price so that 
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they could provide cheaper accommodation.  Respondent C stated that 
the BBP caused brutal evictions of poor households who were living in bad 
buildings. For the building to be renovated and refurbished, the City was 
putting eviction orders to evict occupiers of bad buildings. Then later the 
private developers who bought bad buildings from the auction also evicted 
people from bad buildings. There were massive evictions which resulted in 
many people being homeless (respondent E). 
 
The evictees took the City to court because they felt that the City should 
help them. The City argued that it did not have the obligation to assists 
people who have been evicted by private developers (respondent E). 
However, respondent E felt that the City’s argument was weak because 
the results of evictions are the same (evictions results in homelessness). 
Respondent E stipulated that in Olivia road court case, the constitution 
court ruled that the City was obliged to provide alternative accommodation 
for the evictees and the evictions cannot take place from these ‘bad 
buildings’ unless the municipality provides alternative accommodation. 
 
Hundred and fifty (150) buildings were identified and were to be put under 
the BBP (interview conducted by Researcher and consultant who worked 
on bad building strategy for City of Johannesburg, 12 June 2009). 
However, 12-15 buildings were successfully refurbished (interview 
conducted by respondent C, 12 June 2009). BBP was officially stopped in 
2008 because:  
1. People bought buildings at auctions and then signed 
commitments to refurbish but did not. Instead they slum lorded the 
buildings. There was a manipulation of the process by 
unscrupulous landlords 
2. Some did not upgrade but only did cosmetic changes and the 
buildings did not turn around. 
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3. Political problem: councillors were saying the BBP only 
benefitted white developers (interview conducted by respondent C, 
12 June 2009).  
 
Respondent C made an interesting point that BBP did not end because it 
failed to achieve its objectives. It was aggressively stopped because of 
Inner City Property Scheme (ICPS), and because the priority shifted to the 
beneficiaries (developers) rather than the end users (low income 
households) (respondent C). Respondent D also felt that the BBP could 
not have been stopped because it was starting to be effective and sadly, 
due to the City’s internal politics, it was stopped. Respondent C felt that 
the programme could have achieved better outcomes if it was not stopped 
because it was the learning experience of how to respond to bad buildings 
in the inner city. Respondent D also felt that if BBP had continued, it could 
have provided valuable contribution to what was meant to be achieved 
respondent E also felt that the programme could have achieved better 
outcomes if the City had accepted when it was challenged in court (Olivia 
road court case)13 and come up with a clear plan on how to deal with the 
evictees.  
 
Respondent D mentioned that even though BBP did not eradicate low 
income housing needs of people living in bad buildings, but it was the only 
plan that tackled and addressed bad buildings in the inner city. This is 
because few buildings were successfully refurbished and provided 
affordable housing for low income inner city residents. Respondent C and 
D both mentioned the fact that the BBP was transferred to Department of 
Economic Development was a mistake that would lead to failure. 
Respondent C mentioned that with time, those who were working in the 
programme would have become more sophisticated in their strategy on 
how to handle different issues. Without a doubt, respondent C believes 
                                            
13The case was in court in 2007 and the judgement came in 2009 (respondent E). 
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that if the programme was not stopped, it could have produced much 
better results. 
 
Respondent D stipulated that the success of BBP was that it provided 
better quality accommodation for the occupants than the previous 
accommodation they occupied even though it was very limited.  
Respondent D further stated that companies like Johannesburg Property 
Company build a good experience and managed to make excellent results 
in towards urban upgrading. Additionally, private companies like 
Johannesburg Housing Company also managed to refurbish buildings and 
provided reasonable accommodation for low income tenants (respondent 
D).  
 
Due to several flaws that BBP encountered, respondent B highlighted that 
the end of BBP gave rise to ICPS to correct the flaws. One of the flaws 
was the interference of legal fraternity. Respondent A stated that the 
programme failed because of the following reasons: firstly, it took the city a 
long time to legally acquire bad buildings. Respondent C and D add that 
even the legal process of transferring the properties was very slow and 
difficult. Secondly, respondent A pointed out that the City lacked capacity 
to follow-up that the upgrading of the buildings materialised. Thirdly, in 
order to upgrade the building, the developer was required to raise a 
substantial amount of capital. Respondent C adds that it was the 
complicated scheme to do and legally the City could not take someone’s 
building and give it to somebody else. Respondent B stated that another 
challenge was the fact that the city did not have a clear plan on what to do 
with the people that were to be evicted from the buildings which were to be 
refurbished.  
 
Respondent B mentioned that the City was obliged by the court of law to 
provide alternative accommodation to the people that were to be evicted 
from bad buildings. Respondent D viewed this as a human problem that 
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was unfair because many of the hijacked buildings, the poor pay the 
criminals who pockets the money and not maintain the buildings. 
However, the court ruling negatively affected the progress of the BBP. The 
process of evictions also took so long and the City could not quickly 
release the buildings to the developers (respondent C). 
 
Respondent A highlighted that only already established developers (white) 
benefited while previously marginalised developers (black) did not. 
Respondent A mentioned that most of the BBP’s beneficiaries/ people who 
bought most of the buildings were white, already established developers. 
The city wanted to bring in black developers in the property space through 
“Property Market Transformation Agenda”. The City did not fulfil its aim as 
the beneficiaries were always white developers. And hence the ICPS was 
established with the intention to diversify pool of beneficiaries who are 
going to work on the refurbishment (respondent A).  
 
Respondent A stipulated that the biggest challenge BBP was that the 
buildings earmarked for refurbishment were occupied. Due to lack of 
alternative accommodation, respondent A stated that even when 
developers were ready to refurbish the buildings, it was difficult to move 
into properties and have them ready for development.  
“The constitutional court has made a ruling that when you do the 
evictions the city must provide alternative accommodation. Without 
the availability of alternative accommodation facilities, it is difficult 
for us to then move into properties and have them ready for 
development. Everything hinges on what we are able to do with the 
occupiers of the buildings. We can take all the buildings in the city 
and make them part of the scheme but if we have got nowhere to 
put people in those buildings, so that we can release those 
buildings for development, we are back to square one” respondent 
A, interview 11th August 2016). 
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Respondent C highlighted that the City had various maps of bad buildings 
of which the database did not correlate. This is because the database was 
not clear about why the building was called bad building. One could not tell 
from the maps whether the building was bad because it had a broken 
window, hijacked, poorly maintained, seat of criminals or it owed the City 
rates and taxes (respondent C). The City needed different strategies to 
tackle these bad buildings as it was using the same strategy for buildings 
with different challenges (respondent C). Buildings which criminal activities 
happen or that are run by criminal syndicates needed to be tackled using 
the police or SARS or even home affairs (respondent C). Other buildings 
just needed the City to negotiate with the owners or even the tenants. 
 
Another challenge that respondent C pointed out was that the City’s 
departments were at complete war with each other. It’s either the City’s 
departments were competing to take BBP or not take the responsibility of 
the bad buildings (respondent C). Respondent C mentioned that there was 
no way the City could tackle bad building without addressing the housing 
crises in the inner city. Another challenge that hampered on the success of 
BBP was corruption. Both respondent C and D mentioned that there was 
corruption in different City departments. Respondent C mentioned that 
there was fraud and corruption in the revenue department. As a result, 
there was lack of transparent information about the bad buildings. 
Additionally, it became hard to find out which bad buildings were available 
for refurbishment. And also, it became hard to track down developers who 
got bad buildings but do not provide accommodation for the intended 
beneficiaries (respondent C). Respondent D also mentioned that officials 
in either rates or various service departments accepted “bonuses” from 
rates collection and the City could not recover the outstanding rates and 
services.  
 
Respondent D raised the issue of gentrification. Due to high construction 
and running costs, respondent D emphasised that it was unlikely that the 
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private developers would largely accommodate low income households 
after renovating the buildings. The consequence of refurbishing and 
renovating bad buildings largely led to the displacement of poor/low 
income households who occupied these buildings. Respondent D felt that 
this was a “stupid objection” because: 
“If you are going to make a building that has been gutted by those 
living in it provide water electricity etc. the building would obviously 
be ‘gentrified’ in comparison to what it once was. That would in turn 
lead to those who had previously lived in it as a ‘bad building’ not 
being able to afford to return” (interview 7th November 2016). 
 
Was affordable housing was realised through BBP  
Respondent C explained that the government had no mechanisms to 
provide affordable housing in the inner city. The government provides 
RDP houses on the green fields or at the city’s periphery.  However, 
developers who converted bad buildings in the inner city provided mostly 
for medium income earners and not for the very poor (respondent C). 
Respondent C made an interesting point that developers provided 
affordable rentals because they managed to provide accommodation for 
the low income households that one could not get elsewhere. Respondent 
C stipulated that BBP was intended for low income households but quickly 
provided for high income because the delivering and running costs were 
extremely high.  
 
Respondent A mentioned that the City does not assist private developers 
financially. It is the developer’s responsibility to source their own funding to 
refurbish the buildings. Respondent A stated that the developers 
sometimes raise funds through commercial banks and it would negatively 
impact on developers’ return on investment if they provide social housing.  
As a result, respondent A stipulated that the City does not dictate to the 
private developers who to accommodate after the building has been 
refurbished. The developers are free to set market related rentals. 
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Respondent A highlighted that there are high chances that after the city’s 
regeneration, low income households are likely not to be able to afford 
housing in the inner city.  
 
 
5.4 Insight into Bad Building Programme 
This section analyses the case study outlined above as well as interpreting 
the findings. Precisely, the section analyses the sub-question: Assess 
whether BBP has delivered affordable housing for low-income people 
living in the inner city. Then this section will analyse the main research 
question: How has the Bad Building Programme performed to alleviate 
low-income housing in the inner city? Assess whether BBP has delivered 
affordable housing for low-income people living in the inner city. 
 
The overall aim of affordable housing is to assist the low and poor income 
households to access decent housing without experiencing financial 
hardship. Households that need affordable housing lack the financial 
capacity to participate in the private sector market. This is because in most 
cases private developers provide market related developments which 
usually excludes the low income households. The general findings of this 
study show that BBP has managed to refurbish few buildings. Out of 150 
bad buildings that were identified and included in the BBP about 12 
buildings were successfully refurbished and renovated. Due to 
construction and running costs, it was difficult for private developers to 
largely cater for low income households. However, there were private 
developers who managed to refurbish bad buildings in order to 
accommodate low income households. 
 
From the interviewee’s view,   the main challenges that led to the BBP 
being stopped was the fact that the City did not have a plan of how to deal 
with the evictees. Other challenges include fraud and corruptions of City’s 
officials, internal politics in the City and lack of political will from 
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government, financial capital to refurbish and renovate the buildings, 
alternative accommodation for the evictees, long and difficult processes of 
expropriating buildings and gentrification. It also took long and was an 
expensive process for the city to acquire/expropriate bad building. The city 
also lacked capacity to make follow ups on private developers that the 
refurbishment actually materialised and whether those who acquired the 
buildings provided affordable housing for low income households.  
 
People who got the buildings were the already established white 
developers and the city wanted to bring in the black developers into the 
property market. Another challenge was that the buildings that were to be 
refurbished were occupied. As a result, the city could not evict the 
occupants without alternative accommodation. The city did not also have a 
clear database of bad buildings. The database did not correlate and this 
made in difficult to why a building was referred to as bad building. Bad 
buildings have different challenges but the city had one size fits all 
strategy to address all bad buildings in the inner city.     
 
The successes of the BBP are that the City managed to identify bad 
buildings in the inner city which needed to be refurbished and provided 
direction for implementation (BBP). Additionally, BBP provided better 
decent and affordable accommodation even though it was limited and it 
addressed the issues of what to do with the people living in bad building.    
 
How has the Bad Building Programme performed to alleviate low-income 
housing in the inner city? 
The BBP was one of the City’s mechanisms of bringing back dilapidated 
buildings into valuable assets as new residential development. It was 
building a good experience and slowly achieving excellent results in 
upgrading dilapidated properties and providing better and decent 
accommodation for low income households. There are private companies 
that performed reasonably well in providing low income housing. 
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Considering the challenges, the BBP did not achieve its intended 
objective. Out of 150 buildings that were put in BBP, 12 were successfully 
refurbished.  If BBP was not stopped, it could have made more positive 
contribution in delivering decent and affordable housing for low income 
households in the inner city. More building could have been refurbished 
and renovated not for housing purposes only but for other economic 
purposed.  
 
 
5.5 Suggestions for research 
The study found that the BBP has rarely benefited the intended 
beneficiaries as housing costs in the inner city are still high. The BBP has 
not alleviated low income housing needs as affordable housing is still a 
major challenge in the inner city. From the literature and desk top 
research, it found almost half (approximately 122 000) of people living in 
the inner city earn R3 500 per month and below. Additionally, the study 
found that the private sector does not really cater for low income housing 
needs as the rental charges are higher than their salaries. As a result, the 
study recommends that the COJ should review the delivery of affordable 
housing in the inner city and respond to the housing needs of the low 
income residents in the inner city. Moreover, the government can 
encourage and assist the private sector in delivering the affordable 
housing thus meeting the need where demand is great.  
 
Most studies have focused on the strategies of dealing with bad buildings 
and inner city regeneration. There is less focus on the people who live in 
these bad buildings. Future research should focus on the experiences of 
people living in bad buildings. In order to improve their living conditions, 
they should be involved when developing the strategies of dealing with 
bad buildings.   
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the aim of BBP, as well as analysing the 
empirical data collected. The findings from the interviews conducted 
indicated how the respondents perceived the BBP. The respondents had 
similar perspective about the BBP and the challenges in proving affordable 
housing in the inner city. The aim of City is to ensure that all residents 
have access to housing as well as basic services and amenities. The City 
is faced with numerous challenges including affordable housing delivery in 
the inner city. The low income residents live in bad buildings as it is the 
only cheaper accommodation they could afford in the inner city. BBP was 
a mechanism for the City to realise its aim and address these problem. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Bad Building Programme (BBP) hoped to renovate bad buildings in the 
inner city and turn them into economically viable assets. Additionally, the 
BBP hoped to increase the housing stock especially for low income 
household. The City views bad buildings and lack of affordable housing as 
a serious challenge that needs to be tackled. Bad buildings provide 
accommodation to the majority of low income households living in the 
inner city. Since 2009, the City has been trying to address bad buildings 
and low income housing challenges in the inner city without a major 
success. The city has developed several programmes to address low 
income housing challenges for poor residents. The chapter presents the 
summary the findings of the study. The chapter then provides the 
conclusion of the study based on the research objective and the main 
research question.  
 
 
6.2 Summary of findings 
The aim of this research is to determine whether the BBP has met its 
strategic mandate of providing decent and affordable housing to low 
income households living in the inner city. The main research question for 
this study is: How has the Bad Building Programme performed to alleviate 
low-income housing in the inner city? 
 
The challenge of providing decent and affordable housing is not only faced 
by the City of Johannesburg (COJ) but the world as a whole. The 
government of South Africa addresses the housing backlog in the country 
through the delivery of affordable housing (RDP and BNG). However, as 
discussed in chapter 2, majority of these affordable houses are at the city 
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periphery away from job opportunities with high transport costs for the 
poor. BBP as an attempt to address bad buildings and increase low 
income housing stock in the inner city has resulted into evictions of poor 
and low income households from their homes thus causing homelessness. 
This shows that there is lack of alternative affordable housing available for 
low income households living in the inner city. However, the City has 
acknowledged the need for low income housing and is committed to 
address the demand.     
 
COJ implemented BBP as a mechanism to address bad buildings in the 
inner city and to facilitate the development of affordable housing delivery. 
Based on the literature, the research found that there is large demand of 
affordable housing and the insufficient supply to meet the need of low 
income households in the inner city. The findings of the study indicate that 
the BBP has achieved moderate success in alleviating low income 
housing in the inner city. The major achievement was the identification of 
bad buildings in the inner city. However, the refurbishment of buildings 
was hampered by lack of alternative accommodation for the evictees. 
Even though the city has developed few housing programmes that 
respond to low income housing challenges, the number of dwelling units is 
very few compared to the demand.  
 
BBP’s challenges ranged from corruption and fraud, alternative housing 
for the evictees, financial ability of private developers to finance the 
refurbishment and renovations of the buildings. BBP was “one-size-fit-all” 
strategy to address all bad building in the inner city. The findings show that 
this strategy could not fully work because one strategy cannot address 
different challenges and categories of bad building. Different buildings with 
different challenges needed to be tackled in different ways. Flexibility 
could have been very useful in addressing different categories of the bad 
buildings.  
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The general outcome of BBP did not fully fulfil its objective of providing 
decent and affordable housing to low income households. The findings 
show that due to high construction and running costs, most private 
developers could not be able to provide low income housing. As a result, 
they provided mostly for middle and high income households. After the 
refurbishment and renovations of bad buildings, the rent levels generally 
increased to the level which was mostly unaffordable to the majority of the 
intended beneficiaries (low income households).  
 
According to the findings, even though the private developers see the 
need to provide affordable housing for low income households, it becomes 
difficult without the government assistance. Private developers set their 
rentals according to market value. Clearly it shows that private developers 
find it difficult to cater for the needs of low income households. Where the 
private sector fails, the state is expected to assist. According to court 
cases, COJ was obliged to provide alternative accommodation for the 
evictees. The City must not only facilitate the housing provision in the 
inner city but also play a major role in providing affordable housing to 
those that are excluded in the market property.    
 
The fact that the City/ government did not assist private developers with 
funding led the BBP to achieve small number of affordable housing units. 
The findings show that most of the private developers raise the capital to 
refurbish and renovate the buildings from bank’s debt funding. Bank’s debt 
funding increases additional costs which hampers that provision of 
affordable housing. For private developers to provide affordable housing 
under this circumstance would increase the developer’s financial risks and 
hampers their success in the property market. However, the findings show 
that these private developers could have been able to deliver more 
affordable housing unit if their rents were set to recover the debt and 
costs. Additionally, the City did not follow up on companies which got the 
building on discounted prices that they delivered affordable housing.    
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6.3 Conclusion of the study 
The government of South Africa provides housing in order to address 
backlog in the affordable housing supply to low households. Chapter two 
of this study provided an overview of affordable housing. The chapter also 
outlined how affordable housing is measured and also challenges in 
proving affordable housing. Amongst the challenges, financial capacity is a 
major challenge in providing affordable housing. Although the national 
government has implemented and delivered massive affordable housing in 
the country, the inner city of Johannesburg still has a major challenge in 
providing low income housing for low income residents. The private 
developers, due to financial constraints, largely find it difficult to respond to 
the of the low income housing needs of inner city residents.  
 
Chapter five discussed the empirical analysis with an aim to answer the 
research question: how has the Bad Building Programme performed to 
alleviate low-income housing in the inner city? To conclude based on the 
findings, affordable housing is in great demand and the private sector fail 
to meet the demand. The shortage of decent and affordable housing for 
low income households in the inner city of Johannesburg is a major crisis. 
The current supply is not able to accommodate the current residents. The 
City of Johannesburg is mainly focusing on providing the RDP/BNG 
houses outside the city. There is less focus in providing housing in the 
inner city.  
 
Many of the low income households stay in bad buildings in the inner city. 
This is because bad buildings offer cheaper accommodation. The BBP 
only achieved to fully refurbish and renovate few buildings thus addressing 
the low income housing needs for the few.  In order to achieve affordable 
housing the City needs look at and try to address the challenges that 
increase the rents. Based on the finding, it is difficult to envisage a 
condition which low income residents in the inner city of Johannesburg will 
afford a decent and affordable housing in future. By this far, the City has 
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not successfully addressed the housing needs of low income residents in 
the inner city. 
80 
 
7. REFERENCES 
 
 
Anofojie, A., Adeleye, O. and Kadiri, M. (2013).Housing quality 
assessment in selected public residential estates in Amuwo-Odofin L.G.A, 
Lagos, Nigeria. International Journal of Research in Earth and 
Environmental Sciences, 2 (6), 7-16. 
Bethlehem, L. (2013). A new dynamic- urban regeneration in the Joburg 
CBD. The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, 69, 17-24. 
Biggam, J. (2008). Succeeding with your Master’s Dissertation: A step-by-
step handbook. Open University Press, New York. 
Borck, R., Pflüger, M. and Wrede, M. (2007).A Simple Theory of Industry 
Location and Residence Choice. Discussion Paper No. 2862. Bonn, 
Germany. 
Charlton, S. (2016).SA housing policy.ARPL7004 Housing Theory, 
Concepts and Policy (PowerPoint lecture slides).University of 
Witwatersrand. 
Charlton, S. and Kihato, C. (2006). Reaching the poor? An analysis of the 
influences on the evolution of South Africa’s housing programme. In Pillay, 
U., Tomlinson, R. and du Toit, J. (eds), Democracy and Delivery: Urban 
Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, Cape Town. 
Chen, J., Hao, Q. and Stephens, M. (2010). Assessing Housing 
Affordability in Post-reform China: A Case Study of Shanghai. Housing 
Studies, 25, (6), 877–901. 
Choguill, C. (2007). The search for policies to support sustainable 
housing. Habitat International, 31, 143–14. 
COHRE, (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions) (2005).Any Room for 
the Poor? Forced Evictions in Johannesburg, South Africa Draft for 
discussion. Centre for human rights and evictions, Johannesburg. 
COJ, (2012). Unsafe buildings tackled. INTERNET: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
7909&catid=88&Itemid=266, accessed on the 25th July 2016. 
81 
 
COJ, (2010). Reconsidering bad buildings. City of Johannesburg. 
INTERNET: 
http://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4939&I
temid=58, accessed on the 18th March 2016.  
COJ, (2009). Opportunities. City of Johannesburg. INTERNET: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4
669&Itemid=315, accessed on the 18th March 2017. 
COJ, (2007). Inner city housing action plan. City of Johannesburg, 
Johannesburg. 
COJ, (2007).Reshaping Johannesburg’s inner city. City of Johannesburg, 
South Africa. INTERNET: 
http://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=126&It
emid=9, accessed 23rd May 2016. 
COJ, (2006). Johannesburg inner city–Common vision, shared success 
end of term report 2006-2011. City of Johannesburg, Johannesburg. 
COJ, (2006). Overview. City of Johannesburg. INTERNET: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
92:overview&catid=30&Itemid=58, accessed on the 14thAugust, 2016.   
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others (2000). 
Croese, S., Cirolia, L. and Graham, N. (2016). Towards Habitat III: 
Confronting  the disjuncture between global policy and local  practice on 
Africa’s ‘Challenge of Slums’. Habitat International, 53, 237-242. 
Department of Human Settlements, (2015).Towards a policy foundation for 
the development of human settlements legislation. Department of Human 
Settlements, Pretoria. 
Few, R., Gouveia, N., Mathee, A., Harpham, T., Cohn, A., Swart, A. and 
Coulson, N. (2004). Informal sub-division of residential and  commercial 
buildings in Sao Paulo and Johannesburg: living conditions and policy 
implications. Habitat International, 28 427-442. 
82 
 
Greenlee, A. and Wilson B. (2016). Where Does Location Affordability 
Drive Residential Mobility? An Analysis of Origin and Destination 
communities. Housing Policy Debate, 26 (4-5), 583-606. 
Himlin, B. (2008). People’s Housing Process: Enhanced! NGO Pulse. 
INTERNET: http://www.planact.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/7.-
Peoples-Housing-Process-Enhanced.pdf, accessed on the 30thJanuary 
2017. 
Huchzermeyer, M. and Karam, A. (2016). South African housing policy 
over two decades: 1994-2014. In Kepe, T., Levin, M. and von Liers, B. 
(eds), Twenty Years of Freedom. UCT Press, Cape Town. 
Human Settlements, (2012).South Africa yearbook 2012/13. German 
Technical Cooperation, Pretoria. 
IRR (South African Institute of Race Relations) (2015). South Africa’s 
Housing conundrum. The policy bulletin of the IRR, 4, 20. 
JDA (Johannesburg Development Agency), (2016). Johannesburg Inner 
City Housing Strategy and Implementation Plan 2014-2021. Johannesburg 
Development Agency, Johannesburg. 
JDA, (2015).Inner City Transformation & Investment Trends 2009-2014. 
Johannesburg Development Agency, Johannesburg. 
Jewkes, M. and Delgadillo, L. (2010).Weaknesses of Housing Affordability 
Indices Used by Practitioners. Journal of Financial Counselling and 
Planning, 21, (1), 43-52. 
Lemanski, C. (2014). Hybrid gentrification in South Africa: Theorising 
across southern and northern cities. Urban Studies, XX (X) 1-18. 
Lemanski, C. (2011). Moving up the Ladder or Stuck on the Bottom Rung? 
Homeownership as a Solution to Poverty in Urban South Africa. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35 (1), 57- 77. 
Litman, T. (2016).Affordable-accessible housing in a dynamic city: Why 
and how to increase affordable housing in accessible  neighbourhoods. 
Victoria Transport Policy Institute. 
83 
 
Mosselson, A. (2017). ‘Joburg has its own momentum’: Towards a 
vernacular theorisation of urban change. Urban Studies, 54 (5), 1280–
1296.  
MSF (MédecinsSansFrontières), (2011). Nowhere else to go. Médecins 
Sans Frontières, Johannesburg. 
Nair, D., Enserink, B., Gopikuttan, G., Vergragt, P., Fraaij, A. and 
Dalmeijer, R. (2005).A conceptual framework for sustainable–affordable 
housing for the rural poor in less developed economies. World Sustainable 
Building Conference, Tokyo, 27-29 September. 
Nguyen, M. (2005). Does Affordable Housing Detrimentally Affect Property 
Values? A Review of the Literature. Journal of Planning Literature, 20, (1), 
15-26. 
Planact and CUBES (2007).Urban land: space for the poor in the City of 
Johannesburg? Planact and CUBE, Johannesburg. 
Quigley, J. and Raphael, S. (2004). Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It 
More Affordable? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, (1), 191-214. 
Ram, P. and Needham, B. (2016). The provision of affordable housing in 
India: Are commercial developers interesting. Habitat international,  55, 
100-108.  
Reitzema, A. (2015) accounting for the differential gentrification outcomes 
of the Bo-Kaap and de Waterkant, Cape Town. University of Cape Town, 
Cape Town. 
Rubin, M. (2015). Johannesburg’s Bad Building Programme: the world 
class city hegemony at work? In Haferburg, C. and Huchzermeyer,  M. 
(eds), Urban Governance in Post-apartheid Cities. University of KwaZulu-
Natal Press. Pp. 211-230. 
Scheynens, R., Nowak, B and Scheynens, H. (2003).Ethics. In 
Scheynens, R and Storey, D. (eds), Development fieldwork. SAGE 
publications, London. Pp 139-165. 
Silitshena, M., Kabi, M and Maleleka, D. (2005).Cities without slums 
programme: situational analysis. UN-HABITAT, Nairobi. 
84 
 
SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa), (2013).Minding 
the gap: An analysis of the supply of and demand for low-income rental 
accommodation inner city Johannesburg. SERI, Johannesburg. 
South African Cities Network (2012). Filling the Gaps: Affordable and other 
housing markets in Johannesburg. Affordable Land and Housing data 
centre, South African Cities Network, Johannesburg. 
South African informal city, (2012). Home improvements (panel 2). 
INTERNET: http://informalcity.co.za/home-improvement-2, accessed on 
the 17thAugust 2016. 
Statistics South Africa, (2015).General household surveys. Statistics 
South Africa, Pretoria. 
Steyn, L (2015). When good property turns bad. INTERNET: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-23-when-good-property-turns-bad, 
accessed on the 25thJuly, 2016. 
Tissington, K. (2014). The social costs of inner city regeneration. Daily 
maverick, South Africa. INTERNET:  
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-02-28-the-social-costs-of-
inner-city-regeneration/#.V-PKsC__rIU, accessed on 16thMarch 2016. 
UN-HABITAT (2003).Rental Housing an essential option for the urban 
poor in developing countries. United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT), Nairobi.  
Urban Research Centre, (2008). Housing Affordability Literature Review 
and Affordable Housing Program Audit. Urban Research Centre, 
University of Western Sydney.  
Visser, G. (2002). Viewpoint gentrification and South African cities: 
Towards a research agenda. Cities, 19 (6), 419–423. 
Visser, G. and Kotze, N. (2008). The State and New-build Gentrification in 
Central Cape Town, South Africa. Urban studies, 45 (12), 2565-2593.  
Wiesel, I., Davison, G., Milligan, V., Phibbs, P., Judd, B and Zanardo, M. 
(2012).Developing sustainable affordable housing:  a project level 
analysis. Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute,  Melbourne. 
Williman, N. (2011). Research methods: the basics. Routledge, London. 
85 
 
Wilson, S. (2011). Litigating housing rights in Johannesburg’s inner city: 
2004–2008.South African Journal on Human Rights, 27, 127-151. 
Yang, L., Zheng, G. and Zhu, X. (2012).Cross-nested logit model for the 
joint choice of residential location, travel mode and departure time. Habitat 
International, 38, 157-166. 
Yin, R. (2009).Case study research: Design and methods. SAGE 
publications, California. 
Zhang, T. and Hashim, A. (2011).Theoretical framework of fair distribution 
of affordable housing in China. Asian Social Science, 7 (9), 175-183. 
Zack, T., Bertoldi, A., Charlton, S., Kihato, M and Silverman, M. 
(2009).Draft strategy for addressing blighted medium and high density 
residential “bad buildings” in Johannesburg: working document for 
discussion. City of Johannesburg. 
86 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
 
1. Respondent A: An officer at Integrated Regional Economic 
Development Directorate responsible for Inner City Property 
Scheme. Inner City Property Scheme. Interviewed on the 11th 
August 2016. 
2. Respondent B: An officer at Housing Programme Support. 
Department of Housing, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality. Interviewed on the 31st August 2016. 
3. Respondent C: A Researcher and consultant who worked on bad 
building strategy for City of Johannesburg. Interviewed on the 1st 
November 2016. 
4. Respondent D: Former Executive officer at Central Johannesburg 
Partnership (CJP). The respondent e-mailed the completed 
questionnaires because he is retired and stays in Cape Town. 7th 
November 2016.  
5. Respondent E: Former researcher at the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies (CALS) and Socio-economic rights Institute of South Africa 
(SERI). Interviewed on the 8th November 2016. 
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Appendix 2: Interview questions 
 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
 
Greetings  
My name is Mots’eoa Koali and I am a student studying towards my 
Master’s in Development Planning at Wits University. I am currently 
investigating the extent to which the Bad Buildings Programme has 
alleviated low-income housing in the inner city. The information that I 
collect will only be used for academic purposes. This questionnaire is 
completely anonymous and participation in this research is voluntary. I 
would like to invite you to participate in this research process, however, if 
you are uncomfortable with any of the questions or do not wish to answer 
then that is acceptable and we can stop at any time you like. With your 
permission, the interview will be recorded using an audio recorder and 
hand written notes. If you are willing to participate, I will appreciate if you 
allow me to ask you a few questions. The interview will not take more than 
45 minutes of your time. 
 
 
Can you please introduce yourself? 
 
1. What is your position? 
 
 
2. Did the municipality set any special policy considerations or 
regulations for the companies that undertook the Bad Building 
Programme? If yes, please explain your answer? 
 
 
3. What were the challenges of the programme? 
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4. What were the successes of the programme? 
 
 
5. Did Bad Building Programme have some effects that were not 
intended? If yes, how did you respond to the effects?   
 
 
6. Did you make any follow-up on companies renovated the buildings 
under Bad Building Programme? If yes, how did you make the 
follow-up? 
 
 
7. Did you regulate rentals for companies that participated in Bad 
Building Programme? If yes, how was the policy structured? 
 
 
8. Besides the Bad Building Programme, how is the city responding to 
the housing needs of people living in bad buildings/ earning less 
than R3500 per month? 
 
 
This is the end of my questions. Thank you once again for the 
opportunity to interview you.
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Inner City Property Scheme (ICPS) 
 
Greetings  
My name is Mots’eoa Koali and I am a student studying towards my 
Master’s in Development Planning at Wits University. I am currently 
investigating the extent to which the Bad Buildings Programme has 
alleviated low-income housing in the inner city. The information that I 
collect will only be used for academic purposes. This questionnaire is 
completely anonymous and participation in this research is voluntary. I 
would like to invite you to participate in this research process, however, if 
you are uncomfortable with any of the questions or do not wish to answer 
then that is acceptable and we can stop at any time you like. With your 
permission, the interview will be recorded using an audio recorder and 
hand written notes. If you are willing to participate, I will appreciate if you 
allow me to ask you a few questions. The interview will not take more than 
45 minutes of your time. 
 
 
Can you please introduce yourself? 
 
1. What is your position? 
 
 
2. Why was the Bad Building Programme transferred to your office? 
 
 
3. How did the goals and objectives differ when the programme was 
still managed by City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality? 
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4. How did you measure the achieved goals? 
 
 
5. What were the challenges of the programme? 
 
 
6. What were the successes of the programme? 
 
 
7. Did Bad Building Programme have some effects that were not 
intended? If yes, what were they? 
 
 
8. How did you respond to the effects?   
 
 
9. Did you make any follow-up on companies renovated the buildings 
under Bad Building Programme? If yes, how did you make the 
follow-up? 
 
 
10. Did you regulate rentals for companies that participated in Bad 
Building Programme? If yes, how was the policy structured? 
 
 
11. What were the major lessons learnt about Bad Building 
Programme? 
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12. Besides the Bad Building Programme, do you have any 
programme/project that address the housing needs of people living 
in bad buildings/ earning less than R3500 per month? 
 
 
 
This is the end of my questions. Thank you once again for the 
opportunity to interview you.
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Independent researchers and consultants 
 
Greetings  
My name is Mots’eoa Koali and I am a student studying towards my 
Master’s in Development Planning at Wits University. I am currently 
investigating the extent to which the Bad Buildings Programme has 
alleviated low-income housing in the inner city. The information that I 
collect will only be used for academic purposes. This questionnaire is 
completely anonymous and participation in this research is voluntary. I 
would like to invite you to participate in this research process, however, if 
you are uncomfortable with any of the questions or do not wish to answer 
then that is acceptable and we can stop at any time you like. With your 
permission, the interview will be recorded using an audio recorder and 
hand written notes. If you are willing to participate, I will appreciate if you 
allow me to ask you a few questions. The interview will not take more than 
45 minutes of your time. 
 
 
Can you please introduce yourself? 
 
1. How were you involved in Bad Building Programme? 
 
 
2. What was your personal view about the goals and objectives of the 
Bad Building Programme? 
 
3. What was your impression about Bad Building Programme? 
 
 
4. Was Bad Building Programme good or bad idea? Please explain 
your answer. 
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5. Was the Bad Building successful? Please explain your answer. 
 
 
6. What were the challenges of Bad Building Programme? 
 
 
7. Did the Bad Building Programme have some effects that were not 
intended? 
 
 
8. What do you think was not done properly for the programme to be 
successful? 
 
 
9. Bad Building Programme was criticised by evicting the poor from 
their homes. What was your view on this? 
 
 
10. Were there any other alternatives of renovating bad buildings 
without displacing the bad buildings residents?  
 
 
11. Who were the main beneficiaries of the Bad Building Programme? 
 
 
12. In your own context, what does housing affordability mean? 
 
 
13. What do you think needs to be done for both public and private 
companies to provide affordable housing for the low-income 
households? 
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14. If the same programme was to be done again, what need to be 
done in order for the programme to be successful? 
 
 
15. Do you have anything you can like to say about the programme?   
 
 
This is the end of my questions. Thank you once again for the 
opportunity to interview you. 
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Appendix 3: Participation information sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Evaluation of Better Buildings Programme:  A case study 
of Johannesburg Housing Company. 
 
Greetings  
My name is Mots’eoa Koali and I am currently a full time student 
studying towards a MSc Development Planning in the School of 
Architecture and Planning (SOAP) at the University of 
Witwatersrand. I am currently investigating the extent to which 
Bad buildings have alleviated low-income housing in the inner 
city. 
I am inviting you to be part of the study through an interview. The 
interview will take no longer than an hour of your time. The 
interview will be at your office or any place suitable for you. 
During the course of the interview you will be asked questions 
regarding the Bad Buildings Programme. The interview will be 
recorded using an audio recorder and hand written notes. 
Your participation is voluntary, you may refuse to answer any 
questions that make you uncomfortable, and you may withdraw at 
any time without penalty or loss. You will receive no payment or 
other incentives for your participation. Your participation will be 
completely anonymous and you will not be personally identified in 
the final report. You will be referred to as (respondent A/B/C). 
However, your organisation may be identified. 
The results of the interview and your personal views will not be 
linked to you in the final report. In the event that I use direct 
quotations from this interview, please note that your identity will 
not be revealed. Any comments that you make that you deem “off 
the record” or similar, will not be quoted. Further, any information 
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that you share will be kept confidential and can only be accessed 
by me on a password protected computer. There are also no 
foreseeable risks associated with your participation.  
The research undertaken is solely for academic purposes and 
once completed will be available electronically and can be 
accessed publicly.  
 
If you have any questions, concerns, or comments or if you would 
like a copy of the final report, please feel free to contact me at 
740546@students.wits.ac.za or my supervisor at 
aly.karam@wits.ac.za.  
 
 
Kind regards, 
 
____________________ 
Mots’eoa Koali,  
Masters of Science in Development Planning 
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Appendix 4: Ethics clearance certificate 
 
